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ISRAELI, PALESTINIAN AND EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS OF 
POLITICAL ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
by
Bethamie Horowitz 
Adviser: Professor Stephen P. Cohen
This study investigated how people affiliated with 
different parties in an international conflict understand 
their own actions and the actions of their adversaries. 
Using data gathered in the Middle East in 1982, the study 
examined the explanations offered by 1336 Israeli Jews, 
Palestinians (living in Israel) and Egyptians to three 
political events in the Middle East: 'Israeli Air Force 
conducts a raid on Beirut,' 'Palestinians attack a bus on 
the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is 
announced between Israel and Egypt'.
The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out in 
a sequence of stages. First, the analysis involved a
V
comparison of the substantive interpretations of the 'same' 
events by people from three Middle Eastern societies.
Second, a typology of responses to the three political 
events was developed which identified different cognitive 
orientations toward the conflict environment. Third, 
distinctive patterns of response across the three political 
events were identified using latent class analysis 
(Lazarsfeld, 1954, 1959; Goodman, 1974).
It was expected that parties to a conflict would 
explain the 'same' events differently. The extent of these 
differences, however, varied not only by nationality, but 
with each type of event. War events were seen as more 
familiar and predictable in their causes and consequences 
than peace events. Thus, the study revealed parallel ways 
of thinking about war events across societies. In contrast, 
a peace action generated differences in interpretation among 
all three of the national groups. At the cognitive level 
the peace action appeared to unsettle the stereotypic 
expectations that each party has of the others, implying 
that rather than trying to change perceptions by addressing 
them directly via cognitive techniques, more types of events 
are needed which can shake up the closed perceptual system 
created by ongoing hostile events.
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Introduction
Attribution theory, a topic which has dominated social 
psychology for the past two decades, can be understood as an 
attempt to consider "the ways in which people represent to 
themselves their understanding of the social world in which 
they live" (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978, p. 231). Despite this 
broad scope, much of the research has been more narrowly 
focused on how individuals perceive or infer the causes of 
interpersonal events, and has not considered actions 
involving ethnic or cultural groups or nations. This study 
explores people's understanding of events occurring in the 
context of international conflict. More specifically, this 
study investigates how people affiliated with different 
parties in a conflict understand their own actions and the 
actions of their adversaries.
Attribution theory attempts to explore the differences 
in definition of the situation as experienced by actors and 
observers of a particular action. The actor tends to 
explain his/her own behavior in terms of cues in the 
environment, whereas an observer tends to give more weight 
to the actor's role in the scene. The point is that actor 
and observer present divergent accounts of the supposedly 
same event (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Although the 
phenomenon was originally termed 'the fundamental 
attribution error' (Ross, 1977), for the present purposes 
its significance lies not in the guestion of accuracy of
2
perception implied by the term 'error,1 but in the fact that 
observers and actors seem to attend to such different 
aspects of the total field. The researcher can be viewed as 
scrutinizing both accounts, attempting to explain how both 
explanations can arise out of the supposedly 'same' scene.
The general trend among attribution theorists has been 
to reformulate the goal of the researcher: "...the task of
attribution theory is not to explain why our explanations 
conflict - because they don't - much less to explain our 
errors; it is to explain why, from our different 
perspectives, we tend to emphasize different parts of the 
same total explanation" (Locke and Pennington, 1982, p.
218). Yet, as Billig (1982) specifically notes, "there are 
times when different explanations most certainly do 
conflict..." (p. 186), for instance, as in wartime. The 
present investigation offers a case in point: a study of how 
Palestinians, Israelis, and Egyptians interpret events 
occurring in the course of the Middle East conflict, such as 
air raids, terrorist attacks and peace treaties.
In epistemological terms conflict can be said to 
involve a conflict over the definition of the situation. 
Billig, not writing about attribution theory, notes that 
certain research traditions have had little to do with the 
"problems related to enemies who are not members of a 
coherent higher group and who are struggling violently to 
impose their contrasting world-views upon each other"
3
(Billig, 1977, p. 421). The same could be said of 
attribution literature as it stands. Formulated in this 
way, the problem touches on an underlying issue in social 
theory —  the extent to which theory deals with conflict and 
consensus in social life. On the one hand, Roger Brown has 
noted regarding causal attribution that where there is 
social consensus, there is no need for explanation: "So long 
as we agree about the causes of social action we do not 
notice that causes have to be worked out by a process of 
induction." (Brown, 1986, p. 131). Yet when explanations 
conflict, many attribution researchers attempt to determine 
error or bias in order to reconcile the accounts, as if to 
say that there must be a unitary (and 'correct') 
explanation, rather than attending to the meaning of the 
existence of divergent accounts. There seems to be an 
assumption (or expectation) of consensus underlying all of 
this.1
To speak of 'bias' in an international conflict misses 
the point that actions may have different meanings to 
different parties in a conflict.2 Thus, an event like
^■Billig (1982) makes this point about much theory in 
social psychology.
2Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have argued that 
attribution theorists should adopt the more subjective 
notion of 'bias' in place of 'error', pointing out that "all 
knowledge is subject to bias, but not all knowledge need be 
experienced as erroneous".
4
Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem was not In Itself a single 
thing to be perceived or misperceived: it meant different 
things to different people, depending on where they stood in 
the conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979). And it continues to be 
interpreted and reinterpreted in light of more recent events 
and developments. At the same time, there may have been a 
basic consensus at a 'pre-perceptual' level of how people 
viewed Sadat's visit to Jerusalem: that it was something
momentous which boded change in the status quo. But there 
was no agreement on whether it was good or bad, on why it 
was happening, or on what the consequences would be. Even 
the 'whatness' of the event was problematic —  what the 
Egyptians called "Sadat's visit to Jerusalem" Israelis 
termed "Sadat's visit to Israel". The difference in meaning 
is significant, implying for Egyptians on the one hand that 
Sadat visited Jerusalem (and not Israel), and suggesting for 
Israelis on the other hand that an Arab leader had finally 
come to Israel.
Similarly, the 1982 war in Lebanon takes on very 
different meanings if it is termed "Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon," "Sharon's invasion," "Operation Peace in the 
Galilee," or "the Israeli-Palestinian War." Partly the 
words involve propaganda, the conscious use of language to 
manipulate images. But partly these reflect and perpetuate 
basic perceptual differences.
Regarding a conflict, the relevant question for the
5
social psychological investigator is not 'what are the true 
(unbiased) facts?,' rather, 'what does the interpreter see 
as the relevant facts?'. This reformulation is an important 
one because it redirects any argument over 'the facts' to 
the clash in world views or "reality worlds" (Cantril, 1958) 
of the arguers. A more encompassing view of the situation 
would be one which included the competing views of the 
conflict, rather than one which depended on an agreed-upon 
set of 'facts'. Rendering the issue this way the researcher 
can seek to identify and compare the "preferred modes of 
reasoning" (Harre, 1981) or the preferred modes of 
perceiving of different parties within a conflict setting.3
In the present study some of these relationships are 
examined systematically, using data gathered in the Middle 
East in 1982 as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.4 
The study explores how Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians 
view certain types of political events that have occurred in 
the Middle East conflict: 'Israeli Air Force conducts a
raid on Beirut,' 'Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa -
3In a parallel vein Eiser (1983) points out that the 
very selection of a particular script by which to make sense 
of incoming experience is an event in itself, from which 
particular consequences follow.
4"Images in Conflict" was a cross-cultural study about 
the Arab-Israeli conflict which was conducted in the Middle 
East and the United States. It is described in detail in the 
'method section' of this paper.
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Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is announced between 
Israel and Egypt'. In addition to these questions, the 
respondents were interviewed about their perceptions, 
expectations and desires about conflict and peace, so that 
it is possible to relate people's explanations of political 
events to a larger body of images, beliefs and feelings 
about their experience in the Middle East.
The availability of these data presents an opportunity 
to consider a wider range of questions about peoples' social 
perceptions than is usually possible in attributional 
studies5. In particular, three areas of inquiry are of 
interest. The first involves the comparison of the 
substantive interpretations of the 'same' events by people 
from three Middle Eastern societies. Are there 'preferred 
modes of perceiving' within each national group? The second 
focus of the research is to explore how people within three 
societies involved in a conflict make sense of new 
developments in the political environment. Oo underlying 
outlooks change to accommodate new types of events, or are 
'new' events assimilated into existing interpretive 
frameworks? Finally, the overall purpose of this research
5Kelley and Michela (1980) identify a gap in 
attributional research: "If attribution theory requires, by 
its very nature, a detailed analysis of the common person's 
causal categories, it also requires understanding of the 
natural context in which the process occurs." (pp. 490-491)
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is to explore the implications of these questions for 
conflict resolution. The examination of these substantive 
issues, using empirical data gathered in a large-scale study 
in the Middle East, offers systematic consideration of 
problems central to peacemaking in the Middle East.
A Conflict Resolution Perspective
So far the rationale for this study has been 
expressed by proposing that the consideration of the case of 
international conflict can expand social psychologists' 
understanding of the dynamics of causal attribution, by 
providing a 'hot' context within which to consider the 
competing causal analyses offered by the various parties 
involved in a conflict. The present study also emerges out 
of an interest in peacemaking, however. From this 
perspective, attributional analysis might be seen as a 
useful tool or starting point for researchers interested in 
conflict and conflict resolution, since it can help to 
sharpen each party's awareness of the existence of diverse 
accounts for the 'same' event.
The dissertation falls within a tradition in the field 
of conflict resolution that is distinctly socio- 
psychological (Kelman, Cohen, 1979; Deutsch, 1973; Lewin, 
1948; Simmel, 1955; Sherif, 1967; Rapoport, 1960, 1974; 
Swingle, 1970). This perspective starts from the assumption 
that the parties' apparent resistance or inability to
8
'reason peacefully' Is a result of the dynamics and context 
of conflict, rather than due to Inherent evil or stupidity 
of the parties themselves. This approach to conflict 
resolution has neither focused on the history and origins of 
the conflict, nor attempted to identify a specific 
substantive solution. Rather, it has addressed the kinds 
of processes which escalate conflict and those which lead 
towards conflict resolution.
Research from within this perspective has contributed 
certain ideas to the analysis of conflict. For example, the 
asymmetry of knowledge for parties within the conflict 
system (knowing more about one's own side than about the 
other side) has been identified as a basic characteristic of 
conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979). Compounded with the 
virtual lack of interaction between the societies in an 
ongoing conflict, such asymmetry leads to a predom'.nance of 
strategic thinking, wherein any information received about 
the enemy is interpreted in terms of its presumed 
destructive intent. For would-be conflict resolvers the 
challenge becomes one of finding ways for the parties to 
communicate accurately and credibly to each other in the 
face of these strong countervailing tendencies. Ultimately 
this approach to conflict resolution suggests that the 
problem of peacemaking involves not only changing each 
party's actual intentions (desires) regarding peaceful 
relations, but also increasing the capacity of each side to
9
believe that the other side has changed.
The Problem-solving Workshop
One research setting which has proved fruitful for 
identifying the requirements for credible communication has 
been the problem-solving workshop (Kelman, Cohen, 1979; 
Cohen, Kelman, Miller & Smith, 1977; also Doob, 1970, Doob 
and Foltz, 1973 and Burton, 1969 for related approaches). 
Within this mini-environment of four participants from each 
side (e.g. Israelis and Palestinians) and a third party of 
social scientists there is an opportunity to explore a 
powerful phenomenon in international conflict: the strong 
differences between the different societies' social 
constructions of reality, and the major behavioral 
consequences that follow from those formulations.
In the course of the problem-solving workshop it 
becomes quickly apparent that despite even the most genuine 
desire to communicate openly with the other side, the 
participants lack a common set of concepts for discussing 
the volatile issues between them. Zionism, PLO, terrorism, 
racism, national identity —  these terms have different 
meanings within each national group. A joke which seems 
funny to one group is insulting to another; a unifying 
symbol proposed by one group in the cooperative spirit of 
the workshop cannot really be embraced by the other because 
it is seen as ultimately coopting (for detailed examples see 
Cohen, et al., 1977). These moments of divergent reactions
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to the same stimulus could be considered 'events' within the 
workshop. Probing these differences in meaning can provide 
experiential rather than simply intellectual learning for 
the participants about the deeper feelings, values and needs 
underlying the political issues, and offers the participants 
a chance to begin to reassess their basic assumptions about 
the nature and goals of the other side, as well as their own 
group's identity and purposes.
Above all, the problem-solving workshop is a rich 
micro-setting for exploring communication in conflict; it is 
a source of hypotheses, although not the place to test 
hypotheses systematically on a broader scale.6 One of its 
analytic contributions has been to identify (and even 
engineer) the types of experiences between the adversaries
6Some have situated the importance of the socio- 
psychological approach in the "pre-negotiation" stage of 
resolving the conflict —  that is, in getting the parties to 
even agree to sit together at the negotiating table —  
rather than as a substitute for negotiation over the basic 
issues involved in the conflict. A protracted conflict, 
such as the one in the Middle East, calls for a different 
conflict resolution strategy than 'simple' interstate 
disputes, since much more is included in the conflict than 
different positions and material considerations. In this 
case, mediation alone is not sufficient:
"Mediation was not successful in modifying basic Arab 
or Israeli attitudes, nor has it resolved the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The root causes of the conflict are too complex 
and too deeply embedded in national ideologies. Such 
conflicts can be resolved only as a result of 
transformations in national values and ideologies, 
transformations that may come about as a result of gradual 
evolution, rather than skillful mediation." (Touval, 1982 p. 
331).
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that can break through the routinlzed or hardened ways of 
thinking that have evolved in each society. In particular, 
the experiences in the problem-solving workshop provide 
powerful anecdotal evidence of the importance of examining 
differences within and between societies in the meaning and 
understanding of significant events. Each workshop offers 
such examples, but not in ways which have been verified 
empirically beyond the small group. The present study will 
explore these differences systematically on a larger scale, 
although without the component of direct interaction between 
people from different sides, in order to identify patterns 
and regularities in the understanding of broader segments in 
each society.
Events Data Analysis
Where the problem-solving workshop might be 
characterized as excelling at the interpretative level (i.e. 
the exploration of the meaning and significance of the 
issues in conflict for the different parties), the "events 
data" approach to international conflict and cooperation 
developed by international relations scholars (Azar, 1980; 
Azar and Ben Dak, 1975; Azar, McLaurin, Havener, Murphy 
Sloan & Wagner, 1977) has emphasized the examination of 
regularities at the behavioral level. While the workshop 
approach shines in providing rich evidence, it falls chort 
when it comes to empirical verification, whereas the events 
data approach has the advantage of being empirically
12
verifiable, although it has the disadvantage of assuming an 
'objective' basis for deciding the meaning of an event.
Events data research emerges out of a concern for 
developing an empirical basis for studying the patterns of 
international conflict and cooperation. In this approach, 
events have been treated as data about the flow of 
international interactions, rather than as stimuli for 
examining differing constructions of reality (i.e. the flow 
of consciousness) as in the problem-solving workshop. These 
scholars have analyzed trends in conflict and peace by 
recording the numerous 'transactions' which occur between 
nations day by day —  such as trade accords, ambassador 
exchanges, border skirmishes, attacks, treaties and summit 
talks —  as reported in various newspapers. The analyst 
codes each event according to a standardized scale which 
assesses the cooperative or conflictive nature of the 
activity. These collections of events provide the data for 
exploring behavioral patterns of relations between nations 
over different time periods. This approach attempts to 
consider the system-level of international relations, rather 
than the view of any particular nation.
Difficulties arise at the operational level, in that 
the evaluation is based on the sender's intent only, and 
does not consider the receiver's perception of the sender's 
intent (Burgess and Lawton, 1975). For instance, Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem might be coded as highly cooperative from
13
the viewpoint of Egypt, but it might be seen as a more 
hostile or suspect action from the viewpoint of another 
actor in the interaction system. The problem here is that 
the database, by excluding the various interpretations of 
the receivers and observers of a particular international 
act, and by emphasizing the view of one actor over the other 
participants in the system, does not in fact capture the 
system-level of behavior. Thus, this approach does not 
permit the researcher to consider the selection process 
involved in international behavior —  what is perceived or 
not perceived, what is communicated versus what is received.
The events data approach has contributed some important 
concepts to the study of conflict and cooperation. Most 
relevant for the present purposes is the notion of a 'normal 
relations range* between nations (Azar, Jureidini and 
McLauren, 1978). This concept refers to the stabilization 
of relations among actors in a system, when a relationship 
comes to be characterized by a limited range of behavior, or 
pattern of interaction, beyond which acts tend to be 
unlikely or improbable at both conflictive and cooperative 
extremes. These equilibrium ranges, "whether mainly 
conflictive, mainly cooperative, or somewhere in between, 
tend to be wide enough to accommodate the perceptions of the 
parties as to what is predictable in light of the behavioral 
experience and structural conditions; they can also shift 
depending on various situations and constraints" (Azar and
14
Cohen, 1979, p. 164). When actions take place which push 
the boundaries of the range, either they are experienced as 
crises, or they are perceived in terms consistent with the 
status quo, the equilibrium range (e.g. a 'peaceful' act is 
understood as in fact being a ploy, or as a conflict- 
escalating action). Thus in the case of a protracted 
conflict it is possible to think of 'peace as crisis and war 
as status quo' (Azar and Cohen, 1979).
This conceptualization is important for the present 
study because it emphasizes the context formed by past 
actions, a context within which subsequent occurrences take 
place. Thus it allows us to pose a socio-psychological 
question about how people and societies deal with unexpected 
events and subsequent changes in their environment.
These two research efforts —  the problem-solving 
workshop and the events data approach —  emphasize different 
aspects of international conflict: the problem solving 
workshop is more depth-oriented in tracing the meanings and 
understanding which develop within each society about the 
relations between them, whereas the events data approach 
emphasizes the ongoing patterns of relations between the 
interacting nations. Each approach acts as a corrective to 
the other: the workshop provides insight about some of the 
internal thinking and feeling within each society which the 
events data approach ignores, whereas the events data 
approach tracks the changing historical environment of
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interrelations among nations. The present study seeks to 
link these two approaches by considering on the one hand how 
different types of actions are digested within each of the 
societies in conflict, and on the other hand, in what way 
changes in the inter-nation environment affect the mental 
frameworks used to make sense of political actions.
The Explanation of International Actions
In theoretical terms the study develops a typology of 
explanation of international actions. Proposing such a 
theory requires drawing on work from three areas in social 
psychology: the analysis of causal attribution, conflict
resolution, and cognitive social psychology. Attribution 
theory will be considered first, and later the insights 
gleaned from conflict resolution and from cognitive social 
psychology will be incorporated. In shifting from 
attributions within the interpersonal world to explanations 
of events between nations, the traditional attributional 
framework needs to be modified to account for differences in 
both the structure of the event to be described (the 
attribution 'scenario') and the functions of explanation in 
the conflict setting. Attribution researchers have 
traditionally examined only the attributional processes of 
individuals about other individuals, without considering the 
larger social and contextual factors that structure the 
social world within which the individual operates.
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Certainly in the case of attributions within the conflict 
environment, the perceptual and evaluative dimensions used 
to explain events result from the conflict itself, and are 
not located solely within the individual. Thus an overall 
adjustment needed for such a theory of explanation of 
political events involves shifting attributional analysis 
from an inter-individual (often merely dyadic) orientation 
to a more genuinely socio-psychological stance.
Attributional Analysis and the Conflict Environment
At its core, attribution theory is a theory about 
salience: it involves the notion that a particular aspect of 
a total scene may be so salient to the interpreter that it 
floods his/her view of what happened (Heider, 1958). For 
the observer the mere activity of the actor within the scene 
captures the attention, whereas the actor 'looks out on' the 
environment, so that the salience depends on the perceptual 
vantage point of the interpreter. The importance of this 
perceptual orientation within traditional attribution 
research is further heightened by considering work of Storms 
(1973) which demonstrates how easily the observer's causal 
attributions can be altered by simply shifting the 
observer's visual focus from taking in the overall scene to 
attending specifically to the actor. This has also been 
explained in terms of getting the observer to empathize with 
or take the role of the actor (Regan and Totten, 1975). The 
researcher can shift the observer's cognitive perspective
17
simply by redirecting the observer's perceptual attention 
(see also Taylor and Fiske, 1978, and Brown, 1986).
The conflict environment changes the nature of the 
salience from largely perceptual to overwhelmingly 
evaluative. It presents a context in which the formal, 
positional differences in the perspectives of the parties 
are further transformed by the evaluative aspects of 
adversarial relations: "the enemy is evil, but we are 
moral". Thus, as Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) have written 
about intergroup attribution, "...behavior does not always 
engulf the field. Rather, the strength and content of the 
prior beliefs about the other group may be dominant.
Indeed, if we take these beliefs to be part of the Gestalt 
'field', we might say that 'the field engulfs the 
behavior'." (p. 111).
Although attribution theory appears to be relevant to 
the analysis of conflict because it is a theory which takes 
into account the different perspectives of two parties 
located in different parts of the physical space, it also 
presents some serious shortcomings when applied to the 
situation of international conflict. First, it is limited 
by its spatial orientation. In the traditional 
attributional paradigm the actor and observer coexist in 
their neutral noninteraction; neither one cares particularly 
about the other's explanation (In fact, they don't have any 
relationship whatsoever!), whereas in a real conflict
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situation the difficult relationship between the two parties 
itself lies at the core of the conflict, and their divergent 
positions are not able to calmly coexist.
The conflict environment places a unique limitation on 
the attributional problem. The built-in tension between the 
parties in a conflict yields a situation in which there are 
either adversaries or allies but rarely neutral parties.
Here there is no easy manipulation of perspectives to get 
the parties to look at things differently; such a technique 
tends to be perceived by parties in serious conflicts as 
disingenuous, a superficial attempt by third parties to 
smooth over deeply felt problems (Cohen, et al., 1977).7
In this light the traditional attributional paradigm 
can be seen as a 'minimally constrained' scenario, since it
7This distinction is further amplified by noting that 
traditional attribution theory has been built on the idea of 
two individuals, whereas in conflicts between groups many 
more elements are involved: not only one person's view of
another, but also the relations between the groups, and 
between individuals and their groups, as well as the 
collective and individual images and ideologies, memories 
and expectations of the conflict (Horwitz and Berkowitz, 
1975; Moscovici, 1981; Rapoport, 1974). Moreover, the 
implications for conflict resolution differ significantly in 
the case of two individuals versus two collectivities. One 
way to resolve a conflict between two individuals is to 
simply separate them, as in a divorce or in an 
organizational setting (Walton, 1969). But when the parties 
are groups of people, whole social structures and ideologies 
are involved, and the conflict is no longer 'resolvable' via 
physical separation, because whether or not the parties wish 
it, they will continue to interact within the social (or 
regional) system. In other words, interaction between the 
parties cannot be reduced to zero.
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is evaluatively neutral. It is surprising that the views 
of actor and observer diverge at all. In contrast the 
conflict environment is nearly over-determined (maximal), 
and the expectation is that accounts given for the 'same' 
event will be radically different.8
Thus, in terms of the scenario itself, several 
considerations distinguish the events used in the present 
study from the types of events used in traditional 
attribution studies. First, both actors and observers in 
the present study are affiliated with various parties in the 
conflict: the actors in the three events to be examined are 
'the Israeli Air Force', 'Palestinians', and 'Israel and 
Egypt', and the observers/interpreters (respondents) are 
individual Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians. This 
element of identity implies that there is more at stake than 
simply being an outside, unaffiliated observer of an action 
(Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1977; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 
Wilder, 1986), in that persons interpreting an event which 
involves their own group will be keenly aware of the 
implications for their own group of the action in the
8This contrast has implications at the practical level: 
in traditional attribution studies the researcher must 
describe a scene or create a plausible vignette (in writing, 
or shown as a film, e.g.) for the subject to interpret. In 
the present study, simply mentioning the 'headline' of the 
event was sufficient to evoke recognition by the respondents 
of occurrences that were very plausible or salient within 
the conflict environment.
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scenario. Moreover, the events described in the present 
study include a 'target' or recipient of an action in 
addition to the actor, a feature which connects the 
interpreter even more to different scenarios by virtue of 
identification with either the actor or the 
target/recipient/victim of the action.9 In this regard it 
will be important to consider the extent of the 
interpreter's affiliation or identification with the group, 
since this may vary across individuals.
Second, whereas the standard scenario in traditional 
attribution studies involves an individual actor and an 
individual observer, the scenarios in the present study 
concern a different type of actor altogether: the actors are 
corporate entities —  'the airforce', 'Palestinians', and 
'Israel and Egypt', while the observers are individuals.
The explanations that individuals give about group/corporate 
behavior may differ in significant ways from individuals 
explaining other individuals' behavior, particularly when 
these corporate actors are nations.
Finally, the actions being performed in these scenarios 
take place within an overall climate of conflict and peace:
9Farr and Anderson (1983) have noted that Jones and 
Nisbett's 'actor-observer' terminology loses the relational 
aspect of 'person-other' in Heider's original work: self in 
relation to other. "The distinction [is] a possible basis 
for differing states of awareness which might alternate 
within one person." (p 63)
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'bombing Beirut', 'attacking a bus in Israel', 'a peace 
treaty*. In this regard individuals' interpretations of any 
event must be considered in relation to their broader ideas, 
beliefs, feelings, desires and expectations about this 
environment, since it is within this context that the 
particular event takes on meaning.
Explanatory Categories for Understanding Events
Given these differences between the situations covered 
by the traditional attributional framework and the conflict 
environment, the value of using the situational- 
dispositional (external-internal) distinction as a relevant 
dimension in analyzing people's understanding of 
international conflict can be evaluated in terms of the 
contributions and limitations of the attributional 
framework. There have been at least two attributional 
studies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Heradstveit, 
1979, Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1975), which found that one 
side's own 'good' act and the enemy's 'bad' act are seen as 
arising out of the acting party's disposition, whereas one 
side's own 'bad* act and the enemy's 'good' act are seen as 
due to the situation. Thus people's interpretations of 
actions reveal themselves as moral, good, justified, and the 
enemy as evil, unjustified. 'When we do a bad act we were 
forced by circumstance, whereas they did it by design.' 
Underlying the use of situational/dispositional distinction 
in the case of conflict is the assignment of credit or
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blame, which is ultimately an evaluative process.10 The 
value of this type of analysis is that it sharply displays 
the parallel structure of each side's perception of the 
conflict. But once it is known that these cognitive 
tendencies exist, and that the conflict setting only 
heightens the distinctions between the parties and thrusts 
the explanations of action into a moral evaluative 
framework, it is worthwhile to examine these evaluative 
factors more directly and specifically.11
Another reason to move beyond the situational- 
dispositional distinction in the case of international 
conflict is that the distinction itself may not be among the 
natural categories that people use in understanding actions 
even in their inter-individual environment (Antaki, 1982; 
Eiser, 1983) . It is important to consider what other 
dimensions emerge in the eyes of the beholders, rather than 
limit the explanations in advance to a situational- 
dispositional formulation. Leddo, Abelson and Gross (1984) 
suggest that the script or knowledge-structure approach
10In a sense this view of the conflict setting 
resembles the 'new look' work in perception, in that 
motivation —  prior beliefs, values and needs —  is seen as 
exerting a powerful effect on perception and cognition. 
Kelley (1973) raises this question about the effects of 
motivation and prior beliefs for attribution theorists.
^Billig (1985) raises a similar point: "prejudice [is] 
more than perception." (p. 85)
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would be more fruitful (see also Eiser, 1983). Buss (1978) 
suggests that 'reasons' will be offered by actors, whereas 
'causes' will be given by observers, when they are asked to 
explain what brought about an event.
Finally, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) write that 
"person-environment (internal-external) categories do not 
esem basic to the process of attribution; instead they 
appear restricted to cases in which the information 
contained in these particular categories may in some way 
further the individual's objectives" (p. 26). Instead, they 
argue, the goals or interests of the person, as well as 
momentary salience or mental availability of particular 
constructs, have more to do with the eventual attributions 
or explanations that people make. It is possible to 
extrapolate from these comments to the interpretations made 
at the group, collective level.
The Social Dimension
The present study considers how people make sense of 
the changing stream of events involving their society and 
other societies in a conflict. A missing element so far in 
the analysis offered by attribution theory is the social 
nature of the attributional process, and the important 
effects of the societal context on the explanatory 
processes.
In a situation of protracted conflict in particular, 
the societal context plays a central role in shaping
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people's understanding of political events which have 
meaning at the group level, in that individuals' responses 
are mediated via various channels of social communication 
which have already filtered the ways of seeing the events —  
the views of the media, statements of leaders, rumors, etc.. 
Hewstone and Jaspars (1984) identify the social nature of 
attributions on three levels. First, the events (objects of 
attribution) themselves involve societies, not simply 
individuals; second, the 'digestion' process involves more 
than individual perceivers, in that people develop their 
understanding of the events via their membership in larger 
groups (or subgroups within societies); and third, 
individuals can draw on the shared (social) beliefs, images, 
representations as a source of schemata about social events.
Thus, recent research in causal attribution has 
expanded the focus from the processes of individual 
perceivers to include the social-contextual aspects of those 
processes (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982; Deschamps, 1983; 
Eiser, 1983; Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Doise, 1978; Tajfel, 
1981; Moscovici, 1981). One line of research in intergroup 
perception and attribution has considered how people 
perceive the actions of other individuals who belong to 
different social groups. For instance, Duncan (1976) 
studied the 'perceptual readiness' of white observers to 
label the behavior performed by black actors as more violent 
than the same behavior performed by whites. Rather than
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merely identifying prejudiced individuals as though they 
existed outside of a particular societal context, Duncan 
suggests that it makes more sense to consider the social 
environment that underlies this labelling tendency. In a 
much earlier study Pettigrew (1958) found that the C-scale 
(conformity) was as good a predictor of racial attitudes 
among South African whites and among whites in the South 
U.S. as the F-scale (authoritarianism). He concluded that 
socio-cultural factors play an important role in heightening 
racial prejudice (in addition to personality factors), 
particularly in areas where there has been a history of 
racial intolerance. These studies demonstrate the 
importance of considering the socio-historical context in 
making sense of individual processer 12
12Thus, in certain research problems the apparent 
disposition is due to the situation. Consider, for 
instance, Milgram's study of obedierce to authority 
(Milgram, 1974). Prior to the study psychiatrists and other 
predicted that only 'beasts' would actually obey the 
experimenter's command to shock the learner ( a 
dispositional prediction). Contrary to their expectations a 
significant number of subjects actually did obey. However 
the compliance rate changed substantially over the course of 
the study's situational variations of the experimental 
condition, and the F-scale was not a predictor of tendency 
to comply. Thus what appeared to be a beastly disposition 
was due to the situation (and the fundamental attribution 
error was committed by the outside observersl). Unlike the 
Authoritarian Personality, which was designed to explore 
prejudiced personalities, the obedience study was designed 
to permit researchers to understand the strength of 
situational factors.
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Another line of research has emphasized the importance
of images at the broader social level for understanding both
the content of individual-level perceptions and the nature
of the evolving relations between groups. Moscovici (1981)
describes the importance of social representations —  the
images, beliefs, myths, stereotypes —  that develop in a
society about various domains in human experience, over and
above the particular attitudes of any individuals. These
representations serve to make the unfamiliar familiar and
the unexpected or unusual predictable. Social
representations link the individual and social levels
together, providing building blocks or mental categories at
the social level for individuals to draw upon, as if from an
existing and constantly evolving store of images, ideas and
'arguments' (Billig, 1985).
If the social aspect of commonplaces or representations 
is stressed, then the implication is that contrary 
elements are liable to be widely disseminated in a 
given society. Apart from a minority of professional 
ideologues... the majority will possess both pro and con elements... (p. 98)
In these formulations, processes which exist independently
of the psychological processes of individuals operate at the
social level, much as lanoue lies over and above parole
(Saussure) or Durkheim's "social facts" differ from
individual behavior.
Similarly, Tajfel (1981) has considered the role of
social stereotypes in intergroup relations, rather than
concentrating only on the functions of stereotypes for the
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individual. He has suggested three main functions that 
social stereotypes might serve: 1) explanations of social 
causality —  explaining why an event occurs; 2) 
justification of actions by one group towards another group; 
and 3) differentiation of identity between groups. It makes 
sense to examine and categorize people's explanations of 
various events in the Middle East conflict in terms of their 
apparent functions at the group/social level as Tajfel 
describes.
On this point Doise (1978), Kelley (1983) and Hewstone 
and Jaspars (1982) have commented on the important causal 
role that intergroup attributions play in intergroup 
relations. The way people explain the actions of the other 
side can change how the relations between groups unfold.
The implication is that it should be possible to spell out 
different types of intergroup reasoning and to delineate the 
implications of different types of explanation for the 
unfolding relations between the groups.
These last points bring us to a final concern in the 
present study, a concern which the attributional framework 
leaves unexplored and unanswered: how people's mental 
categories or causal schemata change over time and 
circumstances. A theory of explanation of international 
actions must take a fluid, dynamic approach in order to 
consider the evolution of mental categories or frameworks 
that people use to interpret the sequence of happenings in
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their environment and the way that each new event 
potentially modifies the mental frameworks. For certain 
events there are readily accessible categories (Bruner,
1957); for other events, new categories emerge or are 
readjusted.
Neisser (1976) has written about individual 
perception:
...perception is directed by expectations but not 
controlled by them; it involves the pickup of real 
information. Schemata exert their effects by selecting 
some kinds of information rather than others, not by 
manufacturing false percepts or illusions. The old 
joke that the optimist sees the doughnut while the 
pessimist sees the hole does not imply that either is 
mistaken. It does suggest, however, that each of them 
will be confirmed in his mood by what he has seen. If 
the environment is rich enough to support more than one 
alternative view (and it usually is), expectations can 
have cumulative effects on what is perceived that are 
virtually irreversible until the environment itself 
changes. But environments do change, and thus loosen 
the grip of the old ways of seeing. The interplay 
between schema and situation means that neither 
determines the course of perception alone, (p 43-44)
Of course, Neisser is writing about the perception of
generalized individuals within a vaguely defined, general
environment, rather than about group or societal
expectations in and of a conflict. In the situation of
international conflict people may have come to expect more
hostilities, yet they do not simply fit all that they
encounter into preset categories. At times, new events
(like a Sadat's visit to Jerusalem) require a change in the
mental categories which would not otherwise be able to
assimilate them. Then the mental structures must shift to
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accommodate the new information.
The present study does not permit the examination of 
changes in people attributions or explanations over 
different time periods, since there are data available from 
one study only. However, the study examines the 
explanations given for different types of events. Certain 
types of events (typical, hostile ones, like attacks or 
raids) are likely to be assimilated into existing mental 
structures, and other events (atypical, or peaceful, 
cooperative ones) to require more accommodation of peoples' 
mental frameworks.
The Method
The study reported here uses data gathered in 1982 in 
the "Images in Conflict" project,1 a unique cross-cultural 
social scientific inquiry about the Arab-Israel conflict 
which was designed and implemented by scholars from four 
national groups (American, Egyptian, Palestinian and 
Israeli). Since the data examined in the present analysis 
were gathered as part of the "Images in Conflict" project, 
it is necessary to outline the overall method and design of 
the Images study before focusing specifically on the 
questions about political events.
The goal of the "Images in Conflict" project was "to 
analyze, understand and overcome barriers to equal status 
and peaceful relations among the peoples in the conflict:
1
The study was supported primarily by the United States 
Agency for International Development, with additional 
assistance from The Ford Foundation.
Dr. Stephen P. Cohen was the Principal Investigator and 
Dr. Harriet C. Arnone was the Project Coordinator. The 
Project Directors were: Dr. A. M. Al-Mashat (Cairo 
University, Egypt), Dr. Edward. E. Azar (Center for 
International Development, University of Maryland, USA), Dr. 
Kadry Hefni (Ain Shams University, Egypt), Dr. Michael Inbar 
(Hebrew University, Israel), Dr. Sharif Kanaana (Najjah 
University, Nablus, West Bank), Mr. Nadim Rouhana (Harvard 
University, USA), Dr. Mohammed Shaalan (Al-Azhar University, 
Egypt), Dr. Ephraim Ya'ar (Tel-Aviv University, Israel).
The present author was a data analyst and research assistant 
throughout the history of the project. None of the 
participants in the research was in any way a political 
representative of any group whatsoever.
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Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians and others" (Cohen, 1983). 
This was accomplished by assembling a group of researchers 
with different national backgrounds (American, Palestinian, 
Israeli and Egyptian, and others) and with different 
disciplinary affiliations (psychology, sociology, 
psychiatry, political science, and anthropology), in order 
to design and implement a cross-national study in four 
societies. The "Images in Conflict" study is the only 
scientific work of its kind about the Middle East or any 
other conflict arena; it is unique in studying people's 
attitudes about an ongoing conflict, gathering data 
simultaneously in different societies, using a common 
research design devised by researchers affiliated with the 
different societies involved in the conflict. In terms of 
the present inquiry regarding people's perceptions and 
cognitions within different societies about conflict and 
peace events in the Middle East, the simultaneous gathering 
of data is an essential feature, because the overarching 
contextual variable of "historical conflict time" must be 
set at the same moment for all societies under 
consideration.
Design and Pretesting
The wav that the "Images in Conflict" project was 
accomplished —  a cooperative project about an ongoing 
conflict carried out by individuals from societies involved 
in the conflict —  was as worthy of study as the survey
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itself. However, for the present purpose it is sufficient 
to note that the entire questionnaire was the product of 
extensive negotiation among the project directors, and that 
the questions about political events to be considered here 
are but one element within a broader multi-method approach 
to the study of attitudes, beliefs, feelings and opinions 
about the Middle East conflict. The study was designed, 
pretested and refined between August, 1981 and January,
1982.
Subjects and sampling
In the "Images in Conflict" project investigators 
gathered data in 10 samples in the Middle East and the 
United States. Over 4000 interviews were completed between 
March 1 and April 24, 1982, a sampling period timed to end 
prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula on 
April 25, 1982.
Two sampling principles were critical to the project: 
(1) that the best possible representation of the population 
in question be drawn, to guarantee the accuracy with which 
the study data reflect the group's opinions, and (2) that 
the samples be directly comparable across national groups.
To reconcile these principles, quota samples were drawn in 
the three populations in the Middle East (Israeli Jews, 
Palestinians in Israel and Egyptians), and additional random 
samples of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel were also 
drawn.
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In the present analysis, three of the ten samples are 
used —  the quota samples of Israeli Jews, Palestinians in 
Israel, and Egyptians. The quota samples are used instead 
of the representative samples in the case of the Israeli 
Jewish sample and of the sample of Palestinians living in 
Israel, in order to have samples that are directly 
comparable with the Egyptian sample, for which no 
representative sample could be drawn.
These three samples were drawn using an adaptation of 
network or snowball sampling techniques (Granovetter, 1976) . 
Each national team used its network of personal 
acquaintances (e.g. friends, students) to begin generating a 
list of potential interviewees. In order to increase the 
restricted pool of names generated by this procedure, each 
person approached was asked to recommend potential 
respondents differing from him/her on predetermined 
dimensions, as a practical means of penetrating other 
political networks at further removes from the research 
team's own network (Granovetter, 1973). A name was not 
added to the list of potential respondents until it was at 
least two steps away from the research team's own circle of 
acquaintances. Diversification within samples was achieved 
by striving to fill with an equal number of respondents each 
of the 32 cells of the following 2 to the 5th power property 
space:
- sex
- age (above/below 35)




The sample sizes are: Israeli quota, 555; Palestinian quota, 
251; Egyptian quota, 530.
The demographic profile of the Israeli Jewish sample 
is: 54% male, with an average age of 33 years (s.d. - 12.9), 
and an average of 12.25 years of schooling (s.d. * 4.4).
The sample is 36% Ashkenazi, 45% Sephardi and 19% 'Israeli' 
(i.e. both respondent and respondent's father were born in 
Israel). Most of the respondents are urbanites (30%) or 
suburbanites (43%), and the remaining 27% live in rural 
areas.
The sample of Palestinians living in Israel is made up 
of 49% males, with an average age of 32.6 years (s.d. - 
12.2), and an average of 10.4 years of schooling (s.d. *
4.7). Most of the sample is Moslem (70%) and the remaining 
30% are Christian. Most of the respondents are urbanites 
(77%), and 23% live in rural areas.
The Egyptian sample is 53% male, with an average age of 
31.8 years (s.d. - 11.8), and an average of 12.6 years of 
schooling (s.d.- 7.2). Three quarters of the people in the
2 These were specific to each subsample: Israelis —
Sephardi/Ashkenazi; Palestinians —  Moslem/Christian; 
Egyptian —  Moslem/Copt.
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Egyptian sample are Moslem, and the remaining quarter are 
Coptic. Most people in the sample live in urban areas (58%) 
and the remaining 42% reside in rural areas.
The interviewing was carried out by teams of 
researchers and their assistants in each of the societies.
In Egypt the bulk of the interviewing was done by graduate 
assistants who had been trained to administer the 
questionnaire. In Israel the Dahaf Research Center handled 
the interviewing, using Jews to interview Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians to interview Palestinians living in Israel.
Data Preparation
All data were transferred to the United States and 
prepared for analysis by (1) coding the closed-ended survey 
data for entry onto computer tape, and (2) translating the 
open-ended text material from Hebrew and Arabic into 
English, in preparation for the 'pre-coding' stage.
Bilingual staff members (native speakers of either 
Arabic or Hebrew) working on the project in New York 
translated the original interviews into English. A 
subsample of interviews from each sample was drawn in order 
to develop a 'pre-coding scheme' for classifying the open- 
ended text material. Lists of verbatim answers were 
compiled from each of the national samples, and from these, 
coding schemata were devised. The rest of the material was 
precoded according to these categories, which were refined 
and adjusted as the precoding took place.
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The Interview
The study was designed to investigate the respondents' 
experiences of the Middle East conflict at a variety of 
levels, using open-ended and close-ended formats.
Individual interviews were used to explore the following six 
aspects the respondent's experience. (1) The interview 
asked about the respondent's personal experience with people 
from different national backgrounds, and about his/her 
willingness to become involved with people from different 
national backgrounds 'now' and 'in time of peace'. (2) The 
respondent was asked about his/her basic image of the 
conflict —  Who are the main parties involved in the 
conflict and what parties needed to resolve the conflict? 
What is the nature of the relations between the various 
actors in the conflict? What are the underlying issues and 
key dimensions which affect the outcome of the conflict?
(3) The interview tapped the respondent's attitudes about 
the dominant political issues of the day —  status of West 
Bank/Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of 
Israeli-Egyptian relations. (4) The interview probed the 
more emotional and motivational aspects of the respondent's 
experience regarding political conflict, through the use of 
photographs and other semi-projective techniques. (5) 
Respondents were queried about various political events 
(including the events questions to be considered in the 
present study). (6) The interviewer recorded basic
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background information about the respondent, including sex, 
age, religion, marital status, education, as veil as 
questions about political identity.
The present inquiry focuses primarily on the questions 
about political events, and will draw secondarily on data 
from other sections of the "Images in Conflict" study in 
interpreting the patterns of thinking within each society 
about these events.
The Present Analysis
As part of the "Images in Conflict" project respondents 
were asked to discuss (using an open-ended format) "what 
would bring about and what would result from" the following 
three events in the Middle East:
1. Israeli Air Force bombs Beirut
2. Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv 
highway
3. A peace treaty is announced between Israel and 
Egypt
The analysis of these interpretations forms the basis of the 
present report.
A particular typology was built into the choice of the 
events used in the "Images" project: two stereotypic, 
hostile events, where one side is the aggressor and the 
other side is victim; and one unusual event (because peace 
is by definition unusual in the case of a protracted 
conflict) between two of the actors. In the present study
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it was possible to compare responses to events in which one 
group is the aggressor and the other is the victim and vice 
versa (events 1 and 2); and responses to negative and 
positive events (events 1 and 2, and event 3). In terms of 
the three events taken as a set it is possible to consider 
whether explanations of events offered by people in 
different societies reveal a consistent, coherent analysis 
of the conflict and of the relations between societies, or 
whether different events call up different analyses, myths, 
scenarios in each case.
The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out in 
a sequence of stages, each one building upon the findings of 
the prior stage. The first stage examines the content of 
the responses to each of the three events; in the second 
stage a typology of responses to the events is developed; in 
the third stage the distinctive patterns of response across 
the three events are the focus.
Stage One; The content of the interpretations
The content of responses to the interview questions was 
examined in the first stage of the data analysis. What are 
the basic understandings or meanings of each event within 
each of the societies involved in the conflict? What are 
the natural categories people use in thinking about events 
in international conflict? What aspect of an event do 
people attend to (the nature of the actor? the effect on 
target? strategic aspect? humanistic aspect? moral nature
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of the act as good or as evil, unjust or aggressive?)? When 
an event occurs, do people consider the basic goals and 
intentions of actors in the conflict? How do they see 
their own national group and the other societies in the 
conflict?
The goal of this stage of the analysis was to identify 
the basic issues and images that emerge in each society 
regarding each event, and to consider to what extent there 
is consensus about the meaning of an event. This was 
accomplished by examining the marginals of the precoded data 
about political events.
Stag? Tw<?; Developing a typology of responses
In this stage of the analysis a typology of responses 
to the events was developed which identified different 
cognitive orientations toward the conflict environment.
These outlooks can be thought of as 'indexed' by the various 
types of answers. In this stage the precoded data about the 
events were recoded into various types of responses.
What are the frameworks or categories which are used to 
make sense of different types of events -- hostile versus 
peaceful, own side versus other side? Do different types of 
events elicit different types of thinking? Or does the 
thinking remain consistent across events?
Are there different frameworks for thinking about 
events —  such as moral versus strategic, or expressive 
versus adaptive or instrumental? Are there different types
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of thinkers or different types of thinking (i.e. do people 
think consistently across events, with different people 
having different styles of interpretation, or does each type 
of event elicit a particular type of thinking across 
individuals?)?
Stage Three: Patterns of thinking across events
Finally, the existence of distinctive patterns of 
thinking or outlooks or inodes of reasoning about the three 
events taken as a set are considered. Are there differences 
in cognitive style or types of thinking which cut across 
national groups, or do national groups have distinctive 
patterns of interpretation?
These questions are important theoretically because 
they address the extent to which societies or subgroups 
within societies develop coherent cultural styles, and to 
what extant those styles change and are changed by the 
evolving conflict environment. How does each particular act 
relate, if at all, to broader images of the conflict, of 
possibilities for peace and justice, or revenge and 
victimization, or reconciliation?
In this stage latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954, 
1959; Goodman, 1974) is used to identify the existence of 
distinctive patterns of response in the data. If patterns 
are shown to exist in the data, the analysis lends support 
to the notion that the existence of underlying (latent) 
variables account for the observed patterns.
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Hypotheses:
Attribution research has demonstrated that the mere 
difference in perspective yields a difference in the 
interpreter's explanation of an action. Experience in the 
problem-solving workshop suggests that societies engaged in 
conflict develop very different "social constructions of 
reality" about the meaning of events in a conflict. In this 
light it is expected that parties to a conflict explain the 
'same' events differently: Israelis, Palestinians and
Egyptians are expected to "read" the three political events 
in ways that reflect their particular socio-historical and 
practical concerns.
The extent of these differences, however, is expected 
to vary not only by nationality, but with each type of 
event. Both events data theory and research on social 
cognition have emphasized the importance of the larger 
environment in shaping and changing the mental categories or 
expectations that people and societies have regarding the 
ongoing flow of events they experience. War events are 
expected to be more familiar and predictable in their causes 
and consequences than peace events. Thus, it is expected 
that there will be parallel ways of thinking about war 
events across societies. The response of an Israeli to a 
Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel may resemble a 
Palestinian's response to an Israeli raid on Beirut. This 
resemblance could be explained in terms of "role" similarity
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within the same interaction system: comparing instances when 
one's own group is the aggressor versus when one's own group 
is the victim in a political event, irrespective of 
nationality.
In contrast, a peace action is expected to generate 
differences in interpretation among all three of the 
national groups. At the cognitive level the peace action is 
expected to unsettle the stereotypic expectations that each 
party has of the others — expectations either of alliance or 
of rejection.
Finally, it is expected that each society will be 
characterized by different patterns of thinking or 
reasoning. These will be distinctive in each of the 
societies.
Preparation of the Data for the Present Analysis
Interviewers for the "Images in Conflict" study posed 
the questions about the three political events using an 
open-ended format, and recorded each respondent's answer 
verbatim . As indicated above, the answers were translated 
and then precoded soon after the interviews took place 
(Summer and Autumn, 1982), using a precoding scheme which 
was devised based on a subset of answers from each of the 
national groups sampled. The precoding schemes are lists 
intended to capture the wide range of answers offered in 
response to the questions about events (see Appendix A).
For each question the coder could record up to two responses
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for 'what led up to' each event and two responses for 'what 
results from' each event. Thus the Intent of the precoding 
phase was to capture as much of the phrasing and meaning of 
the original (raw) answers as possible, while at the same 
time reducing the types of answers enough to permit use of 
computer-aided analytic techniques. All of these steps took 
place as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.
The present study takes the precoded data as its 
starting point. Two decisions about technical aspects of 
the data were made at the start of this study. First, since 
only a minority of people in each sample offered more than 
one answer for "what led up to" an event or "what results" 
from it, only one response to "cause" and one response to 
"result" for each of the three events is included in the 
analyses that follow. Thus there are six variables for each 
respondent —  one cause and one result for each of the three 
events: Israeli raid, Palestinian bus and Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty.
Next, it is apparent from the marginals that the 
proportion of precoded answers to answers coded as "other" 
(i.e. not precoded) is not uniform throughout the total 
sample, either by group or by event [see Table I.]. This 
suggests that certain types of answers within certain groups 
were not "captured" by the precoding scheme, and that these 
answers need to be reviewed in order to equalize the 
proportion of pre-coded to "other" answers.
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At this point it is not feasible to retrieve and code anew 
the large number of responses coded as "other" in the 
precoding (particularly in the Egyptian sample). However, 
attempts were made to impute the meaning of the "other" 
responses wherever possible, particularly in the case of the 
one fifth of the Palestinian sample whose responses to 
results of the treaty were precoded as "other".
The "other" answers were handled at the technical level 
in two stages. Initially, cases with "other" answers were 
eliminated from the description of the marginals (in the 
next section and from subsequent section where the data are 
recoded into a typlogy of orientations towards conflict). 
Later on, when the patterns of response were the focus, 
attempts were made to include as many cases as possible,
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wherever the meaning of an "other" answer can be ascertained 
from the overall pattern of a person's responses.
Stage One 
Basic Marginals
The aim of the first stage in the data analysis was 
to describe the basic understanding that each national group 
has of the three events. This was done in two parts.
First, the pattern of missing answers was considered.
Unlike the data coded "other," where a relatively large 
number of cases with "other" answers might suggest 
inadequate precoding of the data (a technical problem), 
"missing" answers can be said to have a substantive meaning 
under certain conditions. Since the present study was 
designed to consider preferred modes of perceiving, it is 
important to examine areas of "non-perception" or rejection 
among the three events. It may be that the refusal to deal 
with an event, either by refusing to discuss it or even by 
denying its occurrence is a characteristic of intense 
conflict.
Second, the precoded answers were rank-ordered from the 
most frequently occurring responses to the least frequently 
occurring responses in each sample (see Appendix B). Based 
on these rank-ordered responses, the view of each national 
group for each event was summarized in aggregate terms in 
order to paint each sample's understanding in broad strokes. 
This descriptive process has two aspects. One is to 
identify key issues elicited by each event within each 
society. This means that in examining a particular sampling
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group's responses to an event, precodes that seem to mean 
the same thing are combined. A second aspect of description 
involves identifying the areas of consensus and of cleavage 
within each of the national groups in order to determine 
whether there is a modal response to an event, or whether 
there are several different responses.
PART ONE: The Pattern of Missing Answers
There appeared to be a pattern in the "missing" data. 
At the aggregate level, the pattern of "missing" answers 
suggests that selective perception of the events was 
operating. Table 2 displays these results.
Table 2





cause 24.3 7.2 11.2result 27.0 8.4 15.0
Palestinian bus attack
cause 24.5 7.6 11.4
result 28.1 6.0 9.4
Egyptian-Israeli treaty
cause 4.0 4.8 5.2
result 5.5 8.4 8.1
Overall average 18.9% 7.1% 10.1%
One fourth of the Egyptian respondents do not answer 
the questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian 
attack, but most Egyptians have something to say about the
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Israeli-Egyptian treaty. A pattern of response like this 
could be read in substantive terms: there appears to be a 
reluctance, hesitation or resistance by many Egyptians to 
respond to the Israeli and Palestinian hostile interactions, 
compared to Egyptian readiness or enthusiasm in responding 
to the treaty. Or, nearly every Egyptian has heard of the 
treaty, but not about the raid or the bus attack (Some of 
the verbatim answers read, "I have not heard about this 
event"). In contrast, Israelis and Palestinians have more 
similar response rates across the three events, —  around 85 
- 93% of those sampled answered the questions (i.e. 
percentage not "missing"). However, the Israeli response 
rate to results of Israeli raid appears to be significantly 
higher than Israeli response rate to the other events. This 
could be examined further to see whether non-responses is 
indicative of, say, Israeli disapproval about a raid on 
Beirut.
There were some systematic differences between those 
who respond to the events questions and those who do not in 
each sample. In the Egyptian case socio-demographic factors 
seem play a role. For each event those who answered and 
those who did not were compared in terms of age, sex, 
education level, religion and urban-rural. For each event 
these two types of respondents differed significantly by age 
and by sex: the Egyptians who do not answer the questions 
tend to be young women. For Egyptians the treaty is more
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than a political event, in that it penetrates beyond the 
usual level of political awareness of much of the 
population.
For Egyptians and Israelis the Egyptian-Israeli treaty 
seems to be more salient than the other two events, as
suggested by the improved response rate for the Egyptian-
Israeli treaty in comparison to the response rates of these 
samples for the Israeli raid and the Palestinian bus attack. 
However, for Palestinians this is not the case. Similarly, 
both the Israeli and Palestinian samples have more missing 
responses in the case of the results of the Israeli raid and
in the case of the cause of the Palestinian bus attack.
The differences among the political events raise 
certain questions for this research. The Israeli raid and 
Palestinian bus attack involve hostile, Israeli-Palestinian 
interaction, while the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is a more 
peaceful, Israeli-Egyptian event. Either or both of these 
aspects (nationality and hostile/peaceful nature of the 
event) may explain the tendency of Egyptians to respond to 
the questions about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, but not to 
questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus 
attack. Put another way, who are the (88/530 ■ 17%) 
Egyptians who answer questions about the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty only? These questions are examined in greater 
depth in the course of this analysis.
In examining the content of responses to the political
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events, cases with "missing** or "other" responses are not 
included in the calculation of percentages presented below. 
Later on, in Stage Three of the data analysis, most of these 
cases will be included in the analysis of patterns of 
response across the three events.
PART TWO: The Content of the Responses to the Events
I. "Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut"
A. Israeli View
Most Israelis feel that the Israeli raid on Beirut was
carried out in retaliation for prior attack:
71% "retaliation for terrorist attacks"
10 "retaliation for Palestinian or PLO attacks"
19 miscellaneous coded categories 
100% (n-469)
There is very little variation in the distribution among 
categories. Nearly all of the answers (97%) involve these 
elements: retaliation or protection from terrorist or PLO- 
related attacks out of Lebanon.
There is less agreement, however, about the results of 
the raid:
30% "reduce conflict"
17 "more war, conflict"
15 "PLO weakened"
14 "negative world opinion" or "UN response"
9 "people or innocent people killed"
9 "terrorists killed"
6 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n«452)
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Approximately half of the Israeli sample think that the most 
salient result of the Israeli raid is that the raid 
accomplished something, and that it did so by weakening the 
PLO and killing terrorists. However, nearly a third of the 
Israelis expect the most salient result to be more war, 
increased casualties or an increasingly negative response to 
Israel in the world arena as a result of an Israeli raid.
B. Palestinian view
The Palestinian sample responded in a variety of ways
about the cause of the Israeli raid:
26% "Israeli aggression against Arabs"
24 "desire to destroy Palestinians"
24 "retaliation for attacks" ["Palestinian,"
"PLO," "terrorist" or "Lebanon" attacks]
9 "Israeli expansionism"
8 "war, hatred"
9 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-208)
These respondents could be divided into 1) the approximately 
half of the Palestinians who view the Israeli raid on Beirut 
as due to Israeli aggression and Israeli intent to harm 
Palestinians, and 2) the nearly one quarter of the sample 
who consider the raid a form of Israeli retaliation in 
response to attacks on Israel.
Most of the Palestinian sample expect an Israeli raid 
to result in more war and casualties; a smaller percentage
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of Palestinians expect some form of Palestinian or PLO 
retaliation as a result.
45% "more conflict"
28 "people/innocent people/terrorists will be
hurt or killed"
9 some form of Palestinian or PLO retaliation
9 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-207)
C. Egyptian View
The Egyptian sample has a range of ideas about what
would lead up to an Israeli raid on Beirut:
29% "Israeli expansionism"
18 "Israeli aggression against Arabs"
15 "Beirut is a PLO stronghold"
13 "Israeli retaliation for Lebanon attacks"
9 "Israeli attempt to destroy Palestinians"
16 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-274)
To most Egyptians the Israeli raid is evidence of Israeli 
aggression and expansionism. But more than one quarter of 
this sample views the Israelis as acting in response to 
attacks.
The question "What will result from the raid?" elicits
greater consensus. Almost two thirds of the responses coded
involve increased conflict and casualties:
43% "more war"
30 "people killed"
7 "retaliation" by Palestinians or PLO
6 impact on the peace treaty —  (4% negative
impact, 2% positive impact on peace)
14 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-319)
It is noteworthy that a very small percentage of the
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Egyptians explicitly considered the Israeli raid in terns of 
its potential impact on the peace process.
d . Discussion
Most Palestinians and Egyptians in the study feel that 
an Israeli raid on Beirut is caused by Israeli 'disposition' 
rather than in retaliation for attacks. However, Egyptians 
emphasize Israeli 'expansionism' in the region —  a 
territorial concept —  while Palestinians cite Israeli 
aggression and malevolent desire to destroy Palestinians —  
a people concept. In contrast, most Israelis view the raid 
as a form of retaliation for prior attacks, or as a pre­
emptive strike carried out to prevent future attacks. Thus, 
for many Israelis, security requirements lead up to (and 
justify) such a raid.
II. "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv 
highway"
A. Israeli view
Most Israeli Jews believe that terrorism and hatred of 
Jews lead up to a Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel:
37% "terrorist activity"
22 "hatred of Jews"
9 "attempt to terrorize civilians"
5 "interrupt 'normal life' in Israel"
4 "policy of the PLO
23 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-464)
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A substantial number of Israelis expect Israel to
retaliate for such an attack. Many others focus on the




14 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-485)
b . Palestinian view
Palestinians explain the Palestinian attack in two main
ways: l) as a reaction to prior Israeli actions and
policies; 2) as an action in the name of Palestinian
political resistance.
45% "retaliation for Israeli attacks"
13 "Palestinian resistance"
10 "response to Israeli policies"
6 "make demands heard"
6 "desire world attention"
4 attempt to "regain Palestinian homeland"
16 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-211)
One could say that more than half the Palestinian sample
sees such a bus attack as provoked by Israeli actions toward
Palestinians, while nearly a third of the sample sees the
bus attack as a form of political expression —  purposive
behavior in terms of "making demands heard", to "regain
Palestinian homeland", motivated by a "desire for world
attention".
Most of the Palestinian sample expect increased 
conflict and Israeli retaliation to result from the
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Palestinian bus attack, but a small minority of the
Palestinian sample expects the attack to accomplish
something:
38% "more war"
24 "retaliation by Israel"
16 "people killed"
11 attack as achieving its purposes, such as
"force Israel to recognize Palestinian 
rights"
11 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-211)
c. Egyptian View
Nearly half of the Egyptians see the Palestinian attack
as a response to prior Israeli actions, compared to more
than a quarter of the sample who see it as politically
expressive or motivated.
36% some sort of Palestinian or PLO retaliation
28 Palestinian resistance
10 "response to Israeli policy"
26 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-333)
Egyptians explain the results in 3 terms, which, taken 
together, point to an escalation of conflict:
36% "more war"
24 "people, innocent people killed"
23 "retaliation by Israel"
6 "affect peace talks negatively"
11 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-321)
It should be noted that, again, as in the case of results of 
the Israeli raid, Egyptians are unique among the three 
samples in remarking upon the effects of the bus attack on 
peace talks (although only a small group of Egyptians
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mention this). As in the case of the pattern of missing 
data in the Egyptian sample discussed above, where the peace 
treaty elicited a much higher response rate among Egyptians 
than did the Israeli raid or the Palestinian attack, 
Egyptians appear to have a different outlook about the two 
hostile actions than either Israelis or Palestinians. In 
this case the small group of Egyptians who think about the 
Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack in terms of how 
these actions might effect the peace process seem to be 
operating out of an analytic framework which is to be 
contrasted with the more prevalent notions of either blaming 
the aggressor or justifying the action.
D. Palestinian. Egyptian and Israeli answers compared
Whereas Israelis see the Palestinian bus attack as an 
act of terrorism and hatred of Jews which was internally 
motivated, most Palestinians and Egyptians talk about this 
event in terms of retaliation for Israeli attacks or in 
response to Israeli policies, in other words, externally 
motivated. However, a third of each of the Arab samples 
understands the attack in terms of Palestinian resistance, 
or as an attempt to gain world attention in order to make 
demands heard. A greater percentage of Egyptians than 
Palestinians use the actual code "Palestinian resistance" 
(Egyptians - 29%, Palestinians - 13%), suggesting perhaps 
that Egyptians admire and support the Palestinian cause in
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general, whereas Palestinians in Israel are possibly less 
sympathetic to or supportive of "Palestinian attacks” as a 
means. Still, 16% o the Palestinians see some sort of 
political motivation for the attack.
There is consensus within Israeli society about the 
results of a Palestinian attack: more than half of the 
Israelis expect some form of Israeli retaliation. The 
Palestinian and Egyptian samples are split between two main 
responses: approximately one quarter of each sample 
explicitly expect Israel to retaliate and more than one 
third of each sample expect "more war", which probably 
includes Israeli retaliation as one element. 18% of 
Palestinians and 6.5% Egyptians expect that the attack will 
accomplish something.
III. "Israel and Egypt announce a peace treaty"
A. Israeli View




15 Egyptian desire for peace
26 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-492)
Nearly half of the Israeli sample attributes the treaty to 
Sadat and/or Egypt's desire for peace. But a quarter of the 
sample views the treaty as a joint Israeli-Egyptian action
58
rather than a purely Egyptian initiative, and at least 7% 
emphasize the specifically Israeli-based origins or impetus 
of the treaty (whereas only approximately 3t Egyptians or 
Palestinians mention even a joint effort).
When asked about the results of the treaty, Israeli 
respondents offered two main answers: the possibility of at 
least minimal peace or reduced tensions, and concern about 
the Sinai peninsula.
21% "increased chance for peace"
17 "bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace"
16 "normalization of relations"
14 "lessening of tensions"
7 "short-term peace"
15 Sinai —  "loss of", "transferral of",
"withdrawal from"
10 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-471)
Overall, there seems to be a consensus among Israelis (75%) 
that the treaty will move relations in a calming direction. 
However, for many Israelis this could be a bounded 
expectation: nearly one third of this group feels that the 
treaty will bring peace limited to the short-term or to 
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian interaction, as opposed to more 
extensive peaceful relations. Moreover, 15% of the entire 
samples mention the loss of Sinai, which adds to the range 
of reactions which exist in Israel about the treaty: 
enthusiasm, ambivalence, and skepticism.
Thus, although half of the Israelis sampled expect 
positive effects from an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 
there nonetheless is a clear awareness in Israeli society
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about what peace 'costs' then. This is expressed in terns 
of concessions, need to conpronise, giving up Sinai and the 
security it offered.
B. Palestinian View
Most people in the Palestinian sanple enphasize the
Egyptian causal role in bringing about the Egyptian-Israeli
treaty. For then it is an Egyptian-initiated action, and
not a bilateral event, in that around three fourths of the
responses involve 'things about the Egyptians':
21% Egyptian desire for peace
21 "Sadat"
15 "Sadat's treason"
8 "Egyptian desire to regain land"
8 "econonic and social pressure in Egypt"
27 niscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-214)
However, the Palestinian sanple seens to be divided
concerning the evaluation of the treaty itself: 42%
Palestinian sanple view "Egyptian desire for peace" and
"Sadat" as responsible for the treaty (without a spelled out
evaluative aspect), whereas at least 15% of the responses
indicate a clearly negative evaluations of Sadat —  for
instance, "Sadat's treason". It seens clear that nany
Palestinians in Israel are dissatisfied about the Israeli-
Egyptian treaty, which they believe left the Palestinians
out of the arrangenents. The proportion of the responses
would be expected to be even nore negative for other
Palestinian sanples interviewed outside of Israel.
60
The Palestinian sanple's expectations about the results 
of the treaty support this the feeling of foreboding: around 
one quarter focus on inter-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions, 
whereas around one third see a chance of [Israeli - 
Egyptian] peace and normalization of relations. If 
"bilateral peace" and "short-term peace" can be considered 
to be qualified answers or mixed evaluations about the 
aftermath of a treaty, the answers can be arranged in a 
scale ranging from those who see a chance for peace more 
enthusiastically to those who expect negative results from 
the treaty:
28% increased chance of peace) optimistic
6 normalization of relations)
10 bilateral I-E peace ) mixed
expectations4 short-term peace )
15 loss of Arab support for Egypt)
pessimistic8 increased conflict )
71% [subtotal]
29 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-181)
Palestinians also mention Sinai (12%), almost as much as
Israeli Jews. Approximately 6% mention that economy will
improve as a result of the peace treaty, which is not




Most Egyptians view Egyptian national desires as 
responsible for the Israeli-Egyptian treaty:
49% Egyptian desire for peace
15 Sadat
16 Egyptian desire to regain land
20 miscellaneous coded categories
100% (n-407)
Sadat is seen as the cause of the treaty less often in the 
Egyptian sample than among Palestinians or Israelis.
When asked about the results of the treaty, around half 
of the sample mentions the possibility of Israeli-Egyptian 
peace, while around a third emphasize geopolitical and 
economic aspects of the treaty. Compared to Israelis and 
Palestinians, Egyptians appear to be unbridled in their 
enthusiasm about the peace treaty and its by-products:
47% increased chance of peace
19 Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
15 better economy




D. Israeli. Palestinian and Egyptian samples compared
A large percentage of each sample indicates that
Sadat's leadership and/or the Egyptian desire for peace




However, most Egyptians emphasize the desire of the Egyptian
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people, whereas most Israelis and Palestinians emphasize 
Sadat's personal role in the peace treaty. This suggests 
that Egyptians emphasize their own [authentic, bottom-up, 
rather than top-down] will or impetus (or disposition) 
regarding peace, and that Israelis and Palestinians see 
Sadat, more than the Egyptian people, as responsible for the 
treaty. But many Palestinians blame Sadat and see the 
treaty as a result of a "black-top image" (R. K. White,
1972) —  the Egyptian people forced into an undesirable role 
by a treasonous leader, whereas Israelis credit Sadat rather 
than the Egyptian people (and thereby temper optimism and 
enthusiasm about the treaty with skepticism about the 
stability of the Sadat's regime). In comparison to the 
Palestinian view of Sadat, the Israelis' view could be 
termed a white-top image.
No clear scenario about what the treaty will bring 
emerges from the responses of the three samples. Each 
population seems to emphasize aspects of the future which 
embody its own particular concerns. Thus Egyptians more 
than Israelis or Palestinians mention the effects of peace 
in improving the economy (cf. "peace and prosperity" slogan 
under Sadat); Palestinians envision increased conflict and 
inter-Arab tensions. Israelis expect a reduction in 
tension, but stop short of expressing full-blown enthusiasm 
over the possibility of peace "increased chance of peace".
63
SUMMARY:
From the marginals it is clear that Israelis, Egyptians 
and Palestinians offer different explanations for the causes 
and results of the three events. In fact, it is possible to 
identify what could be called 'Israeli' answers or 
'Palestinian' or 'Egyptian' answers, since certain 
explanations are nearly unique to a given population. For 
instance, more than 80% of the people who think about the 
results of the bus attack in terms of its effect on the 
peace treaty are Egyptians. There are also examples of 
distinctively Israeli or Palestinian answers for the three 
events: Only Israelis see the Palestinian attack as 
motivated by the desire "to murder women and children"; 
only they see the peace treaty as coming about due to 
"Israeli concessions". An example of a distinctively 
Palestinian view is the sense that "Sadat's treason" brought 
about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.
There seems to be a changing pattern across events of 
similarities and differences among the views of the three 
national groups. In the first two events, which involve 
Israeli-Palestinian hostile interaction, the Egyptian 
answers resemble the Palestinian answers. But in the case 
of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the views of all three 
groups diverge regarding the meaning of the event. This 
seems to be the case despite the fact the a large portion of 
each sample mentions "Sadat" and "Egyptian desire for peace"
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as leading up to the event, and "increased chance of peace1 
as a result of the treaty. In examining the answers which 
characterize each sample, two points emerge: that each 
society has its own set of underlying concerns and hopes 
about a treaty (i.e. the is a lack of consensus across all 
samples), and that the answers about the treaty seem less 
stereotyped than in the case of the two hostile Israeli- 
Palestinian events.
Stage Two 
Categorization of the Variables
In the second stage of the data analysis the goal was 
to determine which answers are simply variations on a common 
theme and which are representative of different types of 
thinking. The description of the marginals in the first 
stage of the data analysis showed how various responses 
about an event are connected thematically within each 
national sample. For instance, in the case of the Israeli 
sample's explanations of the Israeli raid on Beirut the 
following responses seem linked together —  "Beirut is a PLO 
stronghold", "pre-emptive strike","prevent attacks" "reduce 
conflict", "weaken the PLO", "terrorists killed".
Technically the goal of the second stage of the data 
analysis is to reduce the detailed precoding schemes into a 
simpler typology of responses.
The second stage involved combining answers that are 
similar and separating those which are different. To do 
this it was necessary to make a judgement about the basic 
meaning of the phrase as used by the respondent. Generally 
this judgement is rather straightforward, as in the case of 
factors leading up to the attack on the bus: "desire to 
murder women and children" is coded as "blame", and "to 
regain Palestinian land" is coded as 'political-strategic'.
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However, sometimes the meaning of an answer is more 
ambiguous. For instance, one explanation of what led up to 
the Palestinian attack on the bus is "it is the policy of 
the PLO". This could be categorized as 'political' (part of 
Palestinian resistance) or as 'blame' (i.e. terrorism).
Since mainly Israelis say this, it has been recoded as 
'terrorism,' but were it mainly a Palestinian answer, it 
might have been called 'political.' Had this category been 
offered by Israelis and Palestinians (and/or Egyptians), its 
meaning might have been judged to be different, and a way 
would have been sought to recode it meaningfully across the 
samples. In such cases, the meaning of the response is 
clarified by considering which national group offers a 
particular response.
Even within a sample, the meaning of a response can be 
unclear. For instance, in the case of the Israeli sample's 
explanations of what results from the Palestinian attack on 
the bus, "terrorists killed" could be judged as being in the 
same category as "people killed" and "innocent people 
killed" or as belonging to a different category of response. 
This ambiguity was resolved by examining the correlations of 
these responses and various attitude measures from other 
sections of the "Images" study, which reveal that they 
behave similarly. Thus, they were collapsed into one unit.
These examples illustrate a process in the data 
analysis which could be called 'disambiguation' —  an
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attempt to clarify the meaning of a particular expression by 
referring to who uses it or how it is used (in relation to 
other variables). In this study it was essential to 
identify the anthropological meaning or 'meaning in context' 
of the response provided by the speaker, rather than simply 
relying on a supposed 'dictionary' meaning of an expression. 
The process is one of reconstruction: trying to place the
particular phrase or expression within the larger contextual 
framework that it comes from —  a framework which, in this 
study, is left unspecified in the interaction between the 
respondent and the interviewer since both people are from 
the same national background and share common assumptions.
A final issue regarding the categorization strategy 
emerges when the researcher examines the list of answers to 
the questions about political events. It is clear that not 
all responses involve comparable elements, because people 
responded to the questions in a variety of ways: some 
answers emphasize what is going on, as in the case where 
"peace talks" are seen as leading up to the Israeli-Egyptian 
treaty. Other answers reveal the speaker's evaluation of 
the action, as well as an emotional tone or mood: "Sadat's 
treason", "it couldn't happen", "they were afraid to attack 
the army".
The coding schemes used in this study are developed to 
capture the range of responses about each of the events, in 
order to define distinctive orientations about conflict and
68
peace. The assumption is that different types of responses 
index, albeit imprecisely, different orientations towards 
conflict and peace. The broad goal is to identify these 
underlying outlooks about political events.
Coding Schemes Used
From the examination of the precoded data in Stage One 
it was evident that the questions about the Israeli raid on 
Beirut and the Palestinian attack on the bus (both cause and 
result) elicit a comparable types of response, while the 
questions about the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty call up a 
different set of responses altogether. Thus the two hostile 
Israeli-Palestinian events (raid and bus attack) are coded 
using a common scheme, whereas the treaty requires a 
separate formulation. The scheme used to code the hostile 
events is discussed first, followed by the coding schemes 
used for the peace event. Appendix C contains detailed 
tables of all coding schemes.
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I. Hostile Events: Israeli Raid and Palestinian 
Attack
The typology of responses for 'what led up to' and 
'what resulted from' the Israeli raid and the Palestinian 
attack is presented first (in part A.)* followed by a 
comparison of the distributions of types of responses for 
each national group (in part B.).
A. Typology of Responses to the Hostile Events
The coding scheme divides the responses into four types
of answers about what leads up to hostile actions:
retaliation, political-strategic, blaming, or conflict-for-
granted. These are assumed to be discrete types of answers
about the causes of hostile political events such as a raid
or an attack, which reflect different cognitive orientations
or outlooks about the nature of ongoing conflict.
1) Retaliation for enemy's actions. The reasoning 
here is that the action took place because of the 
other side's prior action, 'we do it because they 
do it'. In other words, this is a reactive, 
stimulus-response orientation. This mode of 
response blames nobody in particular for the 
hostile action, although the respondent has 
automatic sympathy with one group rather than the 
other by virtue of his/her affiliation. The cycle 
itself is not morally tinged —  one just has a 
preferred side, like a favorite team in a game.
The actions themselves do not arouse surprise or 
strong emotions. Thus, "The Israeli Airforce 
conducted a raid on Beirut" because "they had been 
attacked". Likewise, "Palestinians attack the bus 
in response to Israeli attacks", or "in response to 
Israeli policies".
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2) Political-strategic goals or concerns. Political 
scientists, economists or game theoreticians might 
term this the 'rational actor model': an actor 
engages in the rational pursuit of its [perceived] 
interests, and seeks to achieve certain strategic 
goals. In the case of the Israeli raid this outlook 
is expressed by answers which emphasize Israel's 
security needs ("Beirut is a PLO stronghold", "pre­
emptive strike". In the case of the Palestinian 
attack this category includes answers which 
explained the attack in terms of Palestinian 
resistance, liberation of Palestinian homeland, 
making demands heard. This type of answer involves 
goal attainment by the acting side.
3) Blaming the perpetrator of the hostile action. 
Answers in this category explain the hostile act in 
terms of the evil or diabolical disposition of the 
actor. There is an attribution of purposive, self- 
motivated choice of violent methods In the 
Israeli raid this category include "Israeli 
aggression" "Israeli desire to destroy 
Palestinians". In the case of the Palestinian 
attack this category subsumes "terrorism", "hatred 
of Jews", "desire to terrorize civilians, murder 
women and children" and "they were afraid to attack 
the army".
4) Conflict-for-granted. In this category hostile 
events are situated beyond the realm of normal 
causes and effects. In this mode the conflict 
itself has become a permanent part of the 
environment, like floods, earthquakes and other 
natural disasters. This fatalistic attitude is 
characterized by answers in which the ongoing 
conflict environment is seen as the reason for 
violence. For instance this category includes 
answers in which "status quo", "war, hatred", or 
"no reason" are offered as leading up to either the 
Israeli raid on Beirut or Palestinian attack on a 
bus.
The results of the hostile events were categorized
according to a similar scheme:
l) Retaliation bv the attacked party against the 
perpetrator. The reasoning here is that 'if one 
side starts it, the other will respond', a
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stimulus-response model in which these are the 
'rules of the game'. As a result of the Israeli 
raid on Beirut there will be 'Palestinian 
retaliation', or 'Israeli retaliation' in the case 
of the Palestinian attack.
2) Achieve goals. The actor is seen as being
successful in attaining particular strategic or 
political goals as a result of the action. This 
category includes responses which seem to be 
ideologically-based, in that the particular action 
which leads to such results is understood as part 
of a larger, coherent plan. In the case of Israeli 
raid this category includes "reduction of 
conflict", "weaken the PLO". In the case of the 
Palestinian attack this includes "world attention", 
"achieve the objective of stating their cause".
3) People killed. This category includes responses
which blame the perpetrator of the hostile action, 
in that where there are inhuman causes of evil 
actions, there are human costs which result. These 
answers focus on the destruction of people, 
"innocent people" —  individual lives.
4) More war. This category involves a fatalistic
stance about the results of hostile actions. It 
probably includes aspects of the other categories, 
such as "retaliation" and "people die" as elements 
of a more general image of what follows from a 
hostile action in a protracted conflict. Some 
answers consider the results .of the hostile action 
in terms of ongoing conflict, more hatred, anger, 
and hostility. Other response include "nothing".
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B. Comparison across Samples of Coding Schemes for 
Cause and Results of Hostile Events
1. Comparison of Explanations of Cause of Hostile 
Events
Table 3 shows a comparison across the three national 
samples of the types of responses used to explain 'what 
would bring about an Israeli raid on Beirut' and 'what would 
bring about a Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus'.
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Table 3
Comparison Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of 




Retaliation 13.5% 23.6% 80.2%
Strateaic 21.9 10.6 15.6
57.3 62.0 2.3
Conflict _Li.3 3.8 —  1»9Totals 100 % 100 % 100 %
n - 951 - 274 + 208 + 469
chi-square statistics: 
pearson 463.0
likelihood ratio 543.60 





Retaliation 45.6% 54.5% 4.3%
Strateaic 35.4 28.9 9.1Blame 10.2 11.8 80.8Conflict U 4_l7Totals 100 % 100 % 100 %
n ■ 1008 333 + 211 + 464
chi-square statistics:
pearson 535.99
likelihood ratio 603.67 
degrees of freedom 6 
significance .001
Most Israelis view the raid as retaliation for prior 
actions, whereas the majority of Palestinians and Egyptians 
blame Israel for the raid. In contrast, the Palestinian bus
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attack produces the opposite response: Israelis blame 
Palestinians for the attack, whereas most Palestinians and 
many Egyptians view the attack as a retaliation for prior 
actions. The victimized blame, whereas the aggressors 
justify, or at least explain away the action. There is more 
consensus about this among Israelis than for either 
Palestinians or Egyptians. Nonetheless this is the modal 
response for each of the national groups.
However, subgroups within the Palestinian and Egyptian 
samples see the Israeli raid as retaliation, similar to the 
Israeli interpretation. Similarly, subgroups within the 
Palestinian and Egyptian samples talk about the Palestinian 
attack in terms of blame (i.e. emphasizing the aspect of 
intentional harm of the attack). It is possible that the 
Palestinian and Egyptian respondents who explain the bus 
attack as an intentional action are either supporting or 
condemning the action, it is impossible, however, to 
determine from the marginals alone which is the case, 
although ultimately the analysis of patterns of response to 
the events (in Stage Three) may illuminate this point.
Political-strategic thinking appears to be a secondary 
response in explaining one's own actions for all of the 
samples, especially among Egyptians. The percentages of 
each sample responding in strategic terms seems to increase 
when a group explains its own side's aggressive act: More 
Palestinians and Egyptians use political-strategic terms to
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explain the Palestinian attack than they do to explain the 
Israeli raid. More Israelis use strategic terms to explain 
the Israeli raid than they do to explain the Palestinian 
attack. Thus political-strategic reasoning seems to 
function as an alternative form of justification for the 
hostile action of one's own side. Rather than the sort of 
justification which denies that the action was intended by 
the actor, political-strategic explanations describe the 
actor as having longer term, more thought-out motives, and 
as acting with these goals in mind, while not particularly 
seeking to do harm or to punish, as in the blaming mode. In 
contrast to the retaliatory explanation, in which the actor 
is at the mercy of the Other's prior actions, the political- 
strategic outlook reasserts the control of the actor over 
the environment.
Only a small percentage of people in each sample
explain these hostile events in terms of the conflict
environment ('conflict-for-granted'), although a larger 
percentage of Egyptians seem to think this way compared to
the other two samples. This Egyptian tendency appears in
other sections of the questionnaire as well.
2. Comparison of Explanations of Results of Hostile 
Events
Table 4 shows a comparison across national samples of 




Comparison Across Samples off Explanations of Results of Hostile Events (reported in column percentages)
1. ISRAELI RAID
Sample:Egyptian Palestinian IsraeliResponse:
Retaliation 12.9% 18.8% 21.2%
Achieve aoals 7.5 4.9 45.8
People die 30.7 29.5 17.7
Mors -tfflr 45,9 15.3Totals 100 t 100 % 100 %
n - 978 319 + 207 + 452
chi-square statistics: 
pearson 255.86
likelihood ratio 276.74 






Retaliation 25.9% 25.1% 52.4%
Achieve Goals 6.5 18.5 2.7People Die 24.3 16.0 26.8Here JSar 43., 3. 45,2 1 ^ 1Totals 100 % 100 % 100 %
n - 1017 - 321 + 211 + 485
chi-square statistics: 
pearson 153.95
likelihood ratio 149.71 
degrees of freedom 6 
significance .001
"More war" is the modal answer among Palestinians and 
Egyptians for both the Israeli raid and the Palestinian
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attack. "People die" is the second choice In discussing the 
results of an Israeli raid. Are these expressions 
indicative of distinctive outlooks or are they different 
ways of expressing the same thing? Functionally they seem 
to operate similarly, in that they are used more often by 
the population which identifies with the victim in an action 
(i.e. Palestinians and Egyptians in the case of "Israeli 
Airforce conducts a raid on Beirut", and Israelis in the 
case of "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv 
highway"). They seem to express a degree of despair and 
victimization in the face of ongoing conflict.
'Achieve goals' (i.e. reduce conflict) is the modal 
response among Israelis concerning results of the Israeli 
raid, and most Israelis expect Israeli retaliation for the 
Palestinian attack. Both of these categories imply a degree 
of Israeli efficacy or responsiveness toward the conflict. 
However, a portion of the Israeli sample expects Palestinian 
retaliation for the raid (Palestinian responsiveness), and, 
in the case of the Palestinian attack, many Israelis talk 
about the results in terms of people dying (helplessness or 
despair brought on by the conflict).
3. Explanations of Cause and Results of Hostile Events
Comparing the information gained from looking at 
'causes' and 'results' of hostile actions, it is clear that 
'what results from' a hostile action generates fewer
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differences between the national groups than 'what leads up 
to' a hostile action. Among Palestinians and Egyptians 
there seems to be a constant percentage of people who say 
that "more war" will result from these events, whereas 
Israelis seem split between those who view Israeli actions 
as being efficacious (Israeli raid will "reduce conflict", 
and Palestinian attack will result in "Israeli 
retaliation".) and those who are more despairing.
Many people expect more war and ongoing conflict to 
result from hostile actions, but very few people see the 
conflict environment as the cause or antecedent of these 
sorts of actions. This suggests the psychological nature of 
cause of hostile action, as compared to the pragmatic nature 
of consequences. In other words, a wider range of 
expression is elicited by 'what led up to' an action than by 
'what results from it', and one could probably identify a 
respondent's nationality on the basis of his/her explanation 
of the what led up to a hostile action, but not on the basis 
of 'results' of an action. In general, the explanations of 
results of the hostile events seem less helpful or 
explanatory than explanations about the causes of the 
hostile events in revealing the different orientations 
underlying explanations of the events.
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II. Peace Event: Israell-Egyptian Peace Treaty
From the beginning of the data analysis it appeared 
that this event would require a different coding scheme from 
the one used to categorize the responses to the hostile 
events, because the way people talked about the peace treaty 
seemed to differ from how they explained the raid and the 
attack. Peace is a different matter than war. It is not 
simply the opposite of war; it is less familiar and it has a  
different logic. Two different schemes are used to recode 
•what would bring about' the treaty, and two for 'what would 
result from' the treaty. For each of the coding schemes the 
rationale for the scheme is presented along with a 
comparison of the distribution of responses across national 
samples, before moving on to the subsequent scheme.
A. Coding Schemes for Cause of the Treaty
1. Cause of the Israel1-Egyptlan Treaty; Scheme #1 
One way to differentiate the explanations of 'what 
would bring about* the Israeli-Egyptian treaty was to divide 
the responses according to which people's concerns or needs 
are expressed in a particular answer. Thus, one group of 
answers could be called 'Israeli needs' (e.g. "Arab 
recognition of Israeli") and a second could be called 
'Palestinian needs' ("recognition of Palestinian rights").
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A third group of responses involve Egyptian desire for peace 
and/or Sadat's contribution. A fourth group of answers 
includes more pragmatic or instrumental concerns:
a) Israeli contribution, concerns, requirements. For instance "Begin", "Israeli concessions", "Arab 
recognition of Israel".
b) Palestinian contribution, concerns, requirements. 
For instance, "recognition of Palestinian 
homeland", "Sadat's treason", "can't happen", 
"extra-regional involvement".
c) Egyptian contribution. Sadat. "Egypt's desire for 
peace", "Sadat", "Sadat the visionary".
d) Pragmatic concerns. "Desire for a better economy", 
"1973 War", "Egyptian desire to regain land", 
"negotiations".
The results of this coding scheme are displayed in 
Table 5.
Table 5
Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of_the 

















Egyptian Concerns or Sadat 61.7
Pragmatic Concerns 
Total 28-l2 100 % loo %
n - 1118 - 407 + 214 + 497
chi-square 






Although all three samples acknowledge Egyptian Impetus 
leading up to treaty, each group has its own outlook about 
the treaty: Egyptians emphasize pragmatic aspects of their 
experience, such as improving the economy, the October 
(1973) War and regaining the Sinai; Israelis speak 
especially of "mutual desire, compromise", suggesting they 
want an interchange with a negotiating partner; Palestinians 
talk about "Sadat's treason" and "extra-regional 
involvement" as leading up to a treaty of which many 
disapprove, on the one hand. On the other hand, a subgroup 
of Palestinians describes the treaty as coming about due to 
Egypt's pragmatic concerns about Sinai, the economy, and 
internal social pressure.
2. Cause of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #2
The second recoding scheme was based on an underlying 
notion of volition or motivation for the peace treaty, in 
that each of the parties desires in different degrees to 
join into or to acknowledge the Israeli-Egyptian agreement 
about a peace treaty. These responses vary according to the 
extent that the respondent is willing to join in the 
responsibility for the agreement:
a) The peace treaty was adopted because there was 
something to be gained. Answers such as "economy" 
or "regain land" are included here.
b) A negotiation framework made the peace treaty 
possible, and the various parties or leaders sought 
the treaty. This category included "Sadat",
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"Egyptian desire for peace", "Israeli desire for 
peace", "leadership", "Egypt, Israel, USA", 
"Begin", "negotiations".
c) Exchanges or concessions made the treaty possible. 
"Israeli concessions", "recognition of Palestinian 
rights", "Arab recognition of Israel".
d) Circumstances forced the parties into the treaty. 
"The 1973 (October) War", "extra-regional 
involvement or pressure".
e) The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is.a betrayal. The answers subsumed here include: "it can't happen", 
"Sadat's treason".
The results of this coding scheme are displayed in 
Table 6.
Table 6
Comparison of Across samples of Explanations of Cause of the 




Things to be Gained 22.4% 12.6% 4.8%
Negotiation Framework 68.3 51.4 59.4
Exchanges or Concessions 3.7 5.1 27.6Forced ..cr Betrayed* 30»9 Ŝ -2.Total 100 % 100 t 100 %




degrees of freedom 6
significance .001
* The categories 'forced to make peace' and 'the treaty 
is a betrayal' are combined in this table.
The majority of people in all three samples speak of 
negotiations involving various combinations of Egypt, Sadat, 
Israel, Begin, USA, etc. as leading up to an Israeli- 
Egyptian treaty. These are elements in an idealistic
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conception of peace.
The secondary responses for each sanple reveal greater 
variation among the three national groups: a) Egyptians
think about the treaty in terms of things to be gained or 
incentives; b) Israelis emphasize concessions, or what they 
feel they must exchange or give up for peace; c)
Palestinians respond to the treaty in terms of its 
involuntary nature —  they view the participants as being 
forced by circumstances or themselves as being betrayed by 
the evolution of such an agreement at all. Differences 
among the secondary responses of the three samples indicate 
that in each of the societies there are substreams of 
thought about the peace treaty, aside from the dominant or 
modal response, which appear to involves a more pragmatic 
conception of peace, compared to the essentially idealistic 
image contained in the modal response.
B. Coding Schemes for Explanations of Results of the 
Treaty
l. Results of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty; Scheme #1
Two ways of grouping the responses to the question 
'what results from the Israeli-Egyptian treaty' were used.
In the first scheme expressions about the possibility of 
peace are separated from those involving worsening relations 
and from concern about the Sinai, or about the economy.
This scheme preserves somewhat the distinction between more 
idealistic aspects of peace ('peace' versus 'increased
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tensions') and pragmatic aspects of peace ('economy' versus 
•Sinai'):
a) Peace, "increased chance of peace", "reexamine 
Arab attitudes toward Israel", "lessening of 
tensions", "normalization of relations", "short­
term peace".
b) Sinai. "Israeli withdrawal from Sinai", "transfer 
of Sinai", "loss of Sinai and the security it 
provided".
c) Increased Conflict, "increased conflict", "loss of 
Arab support for Egypt", "Sadat's assassination", 
"bad for Israel", "bad for Palestinians", "bad for 
Egyptians", "it can't happen".
d) Economy. "Better economy".
The results of this coding scheme are displayed in 
Table 7.
Table 7






















n - 1097 445 + 181 + 471
chi-square 





This scheme shows that in each of the three samples 
there are people who expect peace to result from the treaty:
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three-fourths of the Israeli sample speak of the possibility 
of peace arising from the treaty compared to nearly two- 
thirds of the Egyptians and around half of the Palestinian 
sample.
Secondarily Israelis think about the transfer of the 
Sinai, as do the Egyptians. However, for Israelis the "loss 
or transferral of Sinai" is a consequence or effect of 
peace, whereas for Egyptians (and probably for Palestinians) 
"regaining the Sinai" is part of the content of peace. The 
Egyptians also show a concern about improving their economy; 
in contrast a strong minority of Palestinians expect an 
increase in tensions to result from the treaty.
2. Results of the Israeli-Eqyptlan Treaty; Scheme #2
The second recoding scheme about results of the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is based on the evaluative 
aspect of the action, which vary in the three societies.
The answers are divided into good, bad or uncertain results. 
Two codes, "withdrawal from Sinai" and "Sinai transferred" 
are coded as 'good' for the Egyptian and Palestinian 
samples, but as 'unclear' for the Israeli sample.
a) Good results. These answers have an optimistic 
aspect to them: "increased chance for peace", 
"better economy", "reeexamine Arab attitudes 
towards Israel", "lessening tension", 
"normalization".
b) Unclear or mixed results, "short-term peace", 
"bilateral peace (only)", "no results".
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c) Negative results, "loss of Arab support for
Egypt”, "Sadat's assassination”, "loss of Sinai and 
security", "bad for Israel", "bad for 
Palestinians", "bad for Egypt”.
The results of this recoding scheme are displayed in 
Table 8 
Table 8




Good Results 85.3 
Unclear or Mixed Results 9.9 


















This scheme indicates that Egyptians are overwhelmingly 
enthusiastic about the results of the peace treaty, although 
around half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples could be 
said to be optimistic. More than a third of the people in 
the Israeli sample express reservations about what the 
treaty will bring, and nearly half of the Palestinians 




It was necessary to devise one coding scheme for the 
hostile events and a separate scheme for the treaty, a 
finding which lends support to the proposition that conflict 
and peace occupy different domains of reasoning. The 
commonalities in the interpretation of the events by the 
three samples underscores or confirms the underlying 
structure of the events as a series: two hostile or war 
events -- one carried out by Israelis and one by 
Palestinians —  and one cooperative or peace event between 
Israel and Egypt.
The Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack can be 
treated as nearly symmetric, in that each group interprets 
its own hostile action in justificatory terms and explains 
the other group's hostile action in terms of desire to kill, 
terrorism, or intentional aggression. Aggressor and victim 
have polarized views, no matters whether Israelis or 
Palestinians are in the actor's role. This occurs despite 
the structural differences that no doubt characterize 
Israeli and Palestinian societies: one with a state and an 
army, and borders, etc., and one without (but with a 
national identity and national aspirations and a liberation 
movement..).
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The peace treaty elicits areas of consensus or 
agreement across groups: Egypt and/or Sadat are strongly
associated with the treaty, and the treaty is discussed in 
terms of a negotiation framework. But strong differences 
emerge between the groups, too:
1) Egyptians credit themselves and speak about expected 
benefits or gains as incentive for joining in the 
treaty. "Peace and prosperity" was the carrot leading 
up to the treaty, and there is overall optimism about 
what the treaty will bring.
2) After crediting Sadat and the negotiation framework, 
Israelis look at the treaty in terms of what they must 
give up to get it (concessions). As a consequence, 
there is a large percentage of Israelis who are 
uncertain about what the treaty will bring, although 
most people are optimistic.
3) Palestinians are split between those who credit the 
Egyptians and those who blame Sadat or Egypt for the 
treaty (thus they see the treaty as a hostile action.). 
Expectations are divided about whether the treaty will 
bring positive or negative results.
Thus, the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is not perceived uniformly 
as a peace action. Egyptians and Israelis do not agree 
about its meaning, although people in each society may view 
it as a 'peace-related action', whereas among Palestinians 
there is a group of people who view its impact as outright 
hostile.
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Another way to evaluate the structure of the three 
stimulus actions taken as a set (construct validity) was to 
examine the pattern of between-group differences across the 
events. The recategorization of the six events variables in 
Tables 3 - 8  indicates that there is a strong association 
between nationality and type of explanation which holds for 
all three events, as indicated by the statistically 
significant chi-square statistics in these tables. In other 
words, for each of the political events there are 
differences between the explanations of the events offered 
by each of the three national groups. However, the pattern 
of similarities and differences between the responses of 
groups was expected to differ for hostile and peace-related 
events. For instance, the views of Egyptians and 
Palestinians may be more similar for the hostile events 
(Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack) than they are in 
the case of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.
Table 9 shows the changing pattern of 'alliances' or 
similarities and differences in outlook, based on the 
partitioning of the likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. 
These statistics are taken from Table 3 (cause of Israeli 
raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 4 (results of 
Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 6 (cause of 
peace treaty, using the 'volition' coding scheme) and Table 
8 (results of peace treaty, using coding scheme #2 - 
'evaluative'). For each event this table lists: l) the
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overall likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, indicating 
the extent of differences between the views of the three 
national groups; 2) the amount of difference due to Arab 
(Palestinian + Egyptian) versus Israeli differences in 
outlook; 3) the amount of difference accounted for by 
Egyptian versus Palestinian outlooks.
The two hostile Israeli-Palestinian events were 
expected to elicit strong Arab - Israeli differences (i.e. 
large chi-square statistic) and weak inter-Arab (Palestinian 
- Egyptian) differences. In contrast, the treaty was 
expected to produce divergent accounts (large chi-square 
statistics) among the three national groups.
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Table 9
Partitioning of Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square: COBBflrlng the 
Pattern of Differences between the National Groups*
Samples Compared: Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
Sflmpleg-gpffipared: Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
Samples.Compared: Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
Samples Compared: 
Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
Samples Compared: 
Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
Samples Compared: 
Egyptian - Palestinian 
Arab samples - Israeli 
Egyptian - Palestinian
chi-sq. df sign.





- Israeli 276.74 6 .001
272.20 3 .001
4.53 3 .21
BVSl Icause) chi-sq. df sign.















- Israeli 181.40 4 .001
97.25 2 .001
84.15 2 .001
*The chi-square statistics used here are taken from Table 3 
(RAID1, BUS1), Table 4 (RAID2, BUS2), Table 6 (TREATY1) and 
Table 8 (TREATY2).
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Table 9 shows that the two hostile actions (RAID and 
BUS) produce a similar pattern of response across the three 
groups —  The Palestinian and Egyptian samples respond to 
these actions in a similar way, whereas Israelis respond 
differently. The overall differences between the three 
groups on the RAID1, RAID2, BUS1 and BUS2 is made up of two 
component parts: the larger chi-square statistic based on 
Arab - Israeli differences in explanation, and the much 
smaller chi-square statistic summarizing Egyptian - 
Palestinian differences in explanation (Although the 
Egyptian-Palestinian difference for RAID1 and BUS2 are 
statistically significant, the sheer magnitude of the Arab - 
Israeli comparison predominates.).
However, the chi-square statistics for these between- 
group comparisons change regarding the Israeli-Egyptian 
treaty (TREATY). The differences between the views of each 
of the three national groups are more pronounced for TREATYl 
and TREATY2 than in the case of the first two hostile 
actions (RAID and BUS). This is seen in the larger chi- 
square summarizing the difference between Egyptian and 
Palestinian outlooks, which in the case of TREATY2 (results 
of the treaty) are nearly as pronounced as the Arab - 
Israeli differences. No 'alliances' in outlook could be 
said to exist regarding the treaty.
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The notion of patterns of response across events is 
useful not only at the between-group level. There are 
varying degrees of consensus within societies in response to 
the different types of events. Table 10 shows the patterns 
of modal answers identified in each of the samples.
Israelis clearly agree among themselves about when they are 
victims, in the case of both hostile events. Egyptians 
display consensus about their role in initiating the peace 
treaty, and about what they will gain from it. Lower 
percentages for the modal responses of the Palestinian 
sample suggest that this sample is characterized by two 
streams of thought in response to each event, rather than a 
unified point of view.
Table 10





















































* 'Retaliation' for the Palestinian sample includes 
'conflict-for-granted', also.
94
So far the discussion has focused on the results of the 
analyses of the aggregate data for Israelis, Palestinians, 
and Egyptians. Modal answers have been identified in each 
of the samples about each of the political events. In the 
third stage of the research, the patterns of answers given 
within each of the populations were analyzed, to determine 
whether there are different types of thinkers or thinking 
within each society and who or what constitute these 
substreams. The task involves identifying patterns of 
perceiving across events within each of the national 
samples.
Stage Three 
Patterns of Thinking Across Events
Prior to this stage the responses to the three 
political events have been treated in aggregate terns on a 
sample by sample basis. In Stage Three the response 
patterns of individuals within each sample are analyzed to 
determine how the understandings of the three events are 
linked by individual people. The main question is whether 
there are distinctive patterns of response within each of 
the national groups. The modal answers identified for each 
national group in Stage Two form the basis of an analysis of 
patterns of response within each of the three samples.
Using latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954,1959; Goodman, 
1974; Clogg, 1977), patterns of modal and non-modal 
responses within each national group are examined 
statistically for the existence of characteristic patterns 
of interpretation across the three events.
The rationale for latent class analysis is that the 
empirical data are an imperfect measure of an underlying 
construct which itself is not directly observable or 
measurable. Use of latent class analysis enables the 
researcher to identify characteristic patterns among the 
responses to a set of categorical items and to test whether 
the patterns observed in the empirical data can be accounted 
for by positing an underlying, latent construct. Instead of 
restricting the analysis to the examination to the
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intercorrelations between individual pairs of items, use of 
latent class analysis permits examination of the patterning 
among a set of items as a whole (in this case the responses 
to the questions about political events). In the present 
research the existence of latent classes would lend support 
to the notion that different outlooks, worldviews or reality 
worlds within each national group result in different 
patterns of response to the questions about political 
events. If the responses to the items are random (i.e. no 
patterning is identified by latent class analysis) then 
either there is no underlying construct or the items do not 
accurately reflect an underlying construct which in fact 
exists.
This approach represents an intrinsic analysis of the 
data about political events, as opposed to an approach which 
evaluates the data in relation to an outside criterion 
(Lazarsfeld, 1954). However, once underlying classes are 
identified for each group, a further analysis is done to 
relate the classes to background information about 
respondents and to other attitudinal variables from the 
"Images in Conflict" study. The discriminant analysis is 
used to examine the construct validity of the classes 
identified using latent class analysis, in order to gain a 
fuller understanding of the substantive meaning of the 
particular pattern of thought represented in each of the 
latent classes.
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Stage Three is divided into three parts, each one a 
within-group analysis of one of the national samples using 
latent class analysis. For each national group: 1) The 
responses are divided into dichotomous values of 'modal' 
versus 'non-modal' responses to each of the questions about 
the events; 2) The total number of possible combinations of 
responses is evaluated in relation to the observed 
distribution of patterns, to see if the distribution can be 
said to represent two or more underlying classes, and if so, 
what combinations of variables are most likely to represent 
each of the classes; 3) Finally, if latent classes are 
identified which explain the patterning of the data, the 
respondents are assigned to classes on the basis of their 
responses, and a discriminant analysis is carried out to 
explore further how the underlying classes are 
differentiated.
I. Palestinian Sample
165 cases are included in the latent class analysis. 
These are the 'complete' cases out of 251 total cases in 
which responses to all variables used in the latent class 
analysis were available (i.e. not coded as "other" or 
"missing"). However these cases include 49 individuals who 
provided answers for all three of the events, but whose 
response to 'results of the treaty' was coded originally as 
"other" (49/251 - 19.5%). For these cases an "other"
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response could be treated as equivalent to 'unclear' or 
'bad' results of the treaty (based on a series of 
comparisons of the means).
Four out of the six variables form the basis of the 
analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of the 
Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of the 
Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Modal and non-modal responses have 
been identified for each of these questions. The 
distributions for the sample as a whole as compared to the 
smaller set of 'perfect cases' are listed in Table 11.
Table 11




Cause of Israeli raid (208)
(0) retaliation, etc. 38% 36%
(1) blame 62 64
Cause of Palestinian attack (211)
(0) resistance/terror 41% 38
(1) retaliation 59 62
Cause of treaty (214)
(0) betrayal/forced 49% 48
(1) negotiation 51 52
Result of treaty (230)
(0) good results 41% 42
(1) unclear/bad results 59 58
Two variables are not included (results of raid and 
results of bus attack) because they do not seem to add much 
to the understanding of each of the events in this sample. 
For instance, knowing how a person understands what led up
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to the Israeli raid on Beirut tells the story of how they 
see the raid. Whether a person sees the results in terms of 
'more war' or 'people killed' does not seem to add to the 
overall picture. The same could be said for results of the 
Palestinian attack on the bus. Thus the latent class 
analysis is based on four dichotomous variables, yielding a 
total of 24 " 16 possible patterns of response.
The first step in latent class analysis is to determine 
whether the variables are related at all. In this case the 
chi-square statistic (Pearson - 28.057, Likelihood ratio « 
27.575 with 11 degrees of freedom) is significant, 
indicating that there is a relationship among the variables.
Next, a two-class model (unrestricted) is tested. This 
model fits very well, indicated by the low significance 
level of the likelihood ratio chi-square testing the 
difference between the expected values of the two-class 
model and the observed patterns in the data (likelihood 
ratio chi-square - 6.723 with 6 degrees of freedom). A 
three class model was tested also, and although it fits, it 
does not represent a statistically significant improvement 
over the two-class model. Moreover the two-class model is 
more parsimonious, so that its results are described here.
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Table 12
Percentage of Palestinian Respondents with Modal Responses 
to Events according to Latent Class
(0) - non-modal response
(1) - modal response
Cause of Israeli Raid
(0) Aggression
(1) Retaliation
Cause of Palestinian Attack
(0) Resistance
(1) Retaliation
















Result of Israeli-Egyptlan Treaty
(0) Good results 22
(1) Bad results 78
55
45
Latent Class Probabilities .40
likelihood ratio chi-square 6.72
percentage of cases correctly allocated
.60
df - 6 
82.12%
The two latent classes contain different 'readings' of 
the three events. The distribution of responses for class 
one indicates that a person in this class would tend to say 
that: Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians leads up to the 
Israeli raid on Beirut; the Palestinian attack on the bus 
comes about due to Palestinian resistance; the Israeli- 
Egyptian treaty is a form of betrayal (or comes about 
because the parties were forced to join in); and the treaty 
will have bad results —  increased tensions, etc. This 
pattern of response can be called the 'conflict maintenance'
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pattern, since the interpretation of the three political 
events is consistent in terms of maintaining or escalating 
hostilities between the various involved parties. People 
with this outlook see Palestinian national aspirations as 
facing a hostile environment, in which Israel is a main 
actor, and see the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a bad omen for 
the Palestinian cause. The conflict maintenance class 
(outlook) comprises 40% of the sample.
Palestinians in class two tend to feel that: the 
Israeli raid is a form of Israeli retaliation for prior 
attacks; the Palestinian attack on the bus is a form of 
retaliation or response to prior Israeli policies/attacks; 
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty came about due to negotiations 
(Egypt, Sadat), and will have positive results (chance of 
peace). This pattern can be termed 'reactive* in that each 
action is interpreted according to an outlook where actions 
are responded to 'in kind'. In comparison to the conflict 
maintenance outlook, the reactive outlook does not include 
as hostile an image of the environment. Israel is not seen 
as malevolent, but as facing its own problems (i.e. attacks) 
and the peace treaty is seen as a sign that change in the 
environment is possible, even if it involves only Egypt and 
Israel. This outlook is held by 60% of the sample.
The statistical program, MLLSA (Clogg, 1977), reported 
that 82% of the cases are correctly allocated to the 
classes, indicating a high degree of confidence in
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differentiating the classes. Since the latent class 
analysis succeeded in separating the data into different 
classes, a further analysis was warranted to examine the 
differences between the conflict maintenance class and the 
reactive class in terms of variables which were not included 
in designating the classes, but which were expected to 
correlate with the latent classes. This is a test of 
construct validity, as well as a means of fleshing out more 
fully the substantive meaning of the two classes.
Several substantive working hypotheses were spelled out 
regarding the factors that were expected to distinguish the 
two patterns of thinking identified in the Palestinian 
sample. People in the the conflict maintenance class were 
expected to be more pessimistic than people in the reactive 
class regarding the likelihood of peaceful relations in the 
region. Since the reactive pattern seems to contain a less 
hostile image of Israel than the conflict maintenance 
pattern, people in this group were expected to be more open 
to 'compromise' solutions regarding Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. People in the reactive class were expected to be 
older, more traditional, and less politicized than people in 
the conflict maintenance class, and, consequently, they were 
expected to identify with the term 'Palestinian' to a lesser 
degree than people in the conflict maintenance class.
A discriminant analysis was carried out to see the 
extent to which differences in background and attitude
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characterize the two classes. Discriminant analysis is a 
multivariate statistical method for distinguishing between 
two or more groups, in this case the two underlying classes 
(conflict maintenance and reactive), identified using latent 
class analysis. Based on the predictor variables included 
in the analysis, the technigue forms one or more linear 
functions which express in a single index the maximum 
separation between groups (Klecka, 1975). The results are 
displayed in Table 13:
Table 13
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes:
Palestinian Sample (n-143)
Groups: Conflict Maintenance (0)
Reactive (1)
Variable
+ optimism about peace 
+ views on Palestinian autonomy on W.B.
+ importance of foreign influence 
+ extent, of Israeli-Arab identity 
+ importance of God's will, justice 
+ Moslem religious identity
- education
+ importance of strength 
+ extent of Israeli identity 
+ Arab unity, justice, leadership 
+ Pal. state within '67 or '47 borders 
+ Arab territories 
+ Jewish territories 
+ age
+ Israeli-Palestinian coexistence 
religion
+ willingness for intergroup contact 
urban/rural residence 
sex
- extent of Palestinian/Arab identity 
after discriminant function:























chi-square -32.36, df - 20 
significance - .04
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Before the discriminant function is formed, the 
predictors are described in univariate terms according to 
two measures shown in Table 13: 1) Wilks' lambda indicates 
the relative strength of each variable in discriminating 
between the groups: the lower the lambda, the more
discriminating power. 2) For each predictor variable the F 
statistic compares the mean scores of each of the latent 
classes. Once the discriminant analysis has been completed, 
the discriminatory power of the predictor variables taken 
together as a set is indicated by the canonical correlation, 
which is a measure of the discriminant function's ability to 
distinguish between the groups. The square of this 
correlation is the proportion of variance in the 
discriminant function explained by the groups. (In the two- 
group situation the canonical correlation is equal to the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the discriminant 
score and the binary group variable.) Finally, Table 13 
shows Wilks'' lambda for the discriminant function 
(indicating the proportion of the total variance in 
discriminant scores explained by differences among the 
groups), as well as its associated chi-square test of 
significance which tests the null hypothesis that group 
means on the discriminant scores are equal.
Table 13 indicates that the two latent classes are 
associated with other attitudinal and demographic measures.
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In univariate terms at least six predictor variables 
differentiate between the two classes, as indicated by the 
lower lambdas and the higher F ratios.
Of the demographic variables included in the analysis 
only schooling is reasonably effective (but not 
statistically significant) in differentiating between the 
two latent classes: People in the conflict maintenance class 
are likely to be better educated than people in the reactive 
class. Although the age does not differ significantly 
between the two groups, there is a slight tendency for 
people in the conflict maintenance class to be younger than 
the people in the reactive class. Neither religion (Moslem 
- Christian), rural-urban differences nor sex differentiate 
between the two groups.
The remainder of the predictor variables included in 
this analysis were attitudinal measures which summarize five 
major sections of the "Images in Conflict" study. These 
sections included: 1) attitudes towards nine different 
proposals regarding the future of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip; 2) perceptions about the importance of 14 different 
elements in determining the outcome in the Middle East 
conflict; 3) perception of the nature of relations (hostile- 
peaceful) between Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians in 
the past, present and future; 4) extent of political 
identification measured by assessing the acceptability to 
the respondent of different 'labels' (e. g. Palestinian,
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Arab, Israeli-Arab, Israeli, Moslem, Christian, Druze); 5) A 
social distance measure regarding the respondent's 
willingness to interact with Israelis in various degrees of 
social intimacy. Each set of questions was summarized by 
creating indices based on principal component analysis. 
Fifteen indices which summarize these attitudinal measures 
were included in the discriminant analysis.
The greatest discriminatory power of any of the 
predictor variables is exhibited by an optimism-pessimism 
index regarding the expectations about future Israeli, 
Egyptian and Palestinian relations. People in the reactive 
class are likely to be more optimistic about the possibility 
of peace than people in the conflict maintenance class. It 
is not surprising that this variable differentiates between 
the two outlooks, since the results of the Israeli-Egyptian 
treaty are coded in terms of good/optimistic or 
bad/pessimistic results.
Another strong predictor variable taps a person's views 
about Palestinian autonomy and/or a limited form of an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank as acceptable 
options regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza: 
people in the reactive class have more positive views about 
this as an option than do people in the conflict maintenance 
class, who oppose the more limited 'compromise' solution.
The role of foreign influence (U.S. power, world Jewry, 
Russian influence, European influence and U.S. opinion) was
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seen as more important in affecting the outcome of the 
Middle East conflict by people in the reactive class than 
people in the conflict maintenance class. This suggests 
that people with the reactive outlook think that changes in 
the conflict environment can originate in forces outside of 
the region.
People in the reactive class are also more likely than 
people in the conflict maintenance class to use the terms 
'Israeli-Arab', ’Christian' or ’Druze* or 'Moslem' about 
themselves. Moslem religious identity also differentiates 
between the two classes. The factor measuring 'Palestinian' 
and 'Arab' identity does not differentiate between the two 
groups, although people in the conflict maintenance class 
were expected to prefer these labels to a greater degree 
than the people in the reactive class. This suggests that 
the reactive outlook is related to a political identity 
which has more than one possibility: it is not less
Palestinian, but more open to other group identifications. 
Some might call this ambivalence; others might call it 
cognitive complexity. The emerging picture is that the 
reactive class is more traditional, religious, and 
politically conciliatory towards negotiations with Israel 
than the conflict maintenance group.
The canonical correlation of .47 indicates that the 
group variable (the two latent classes) accounts for 22% of 
the variance in the multivariate discriminant function (i.e.
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of the full set of twenty predictor variables included in 
the analysis). The results of the discriminant function 
analysis support the notion that there are two distinctive 
outlooks among the sample of Palestinians in Israel.
II. Israeli sample
309 'complete cases' out of 555 cases are included in 
the analysis of patterns across the three political events. 
In this analysis, five out of the six variables are used: 
cause and result of Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of 
Palestinian attack on a bus; cause and result of Israeli- 
Egyptian treaty. 'Results of the bus attack' was excluded 
since it does not appear to add to the meaning of the bus 
attack. The distribution of responses for each of the five 
variables is displayed in Table 14. The five dichotomous 




Israeli Modal Answers for Variables Included in the Latent
Class Analvsis
Overall 'Complete cases'n n-309
Cause of Israeli raid (469)
(0) strategic 20% 20%
(1) retaliation 80 80
Result of Israeli raid (452)
(0) more war/retaliation 54% 54
(1) reduce conflict 46 46
Cause of Palestinian attack (485)
(0) retaliation/strategic 19% 20
(1) blame (terror) 81 80
Cause of treaty* (497)
(0) Israeli contrib. etc. 53% 51
(1) Egyptian desire/Sadat 47 49
Result of treaty (471)
(0) unclear 45% 44
(1) good 55 56
*Coding scheme #1 for treaty cause.
The chi-square test of Independence (Pearson - 36.725; 
likelihood ratio - 41.546 with 26 degrees of freedom) 
Indicates that the variables are related.
A two-class model (unrestricted) Is tested first; this 
model fits the data reasonably well (chi-square - 26.6 with 
20 degrees of freedom, p«.l5). A three-class model 
(unrestricted) Is tested next, and represents a statistical 
Improvement over the two-class model (chi-square - 14.87 
with 14 degrees of freedom), as well as a substantive 
improvement (since it differentiates into two separate 
classes the large clump of responses (over 80%) identified 
as a single class in the two-class model). The three class 
model is shown in Table 15.
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Table 15
Percentage of Israeli Respondents with Modal Responses to 
Events according to Latent Class
(0) - non-modal response
(1) - modal response
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Cause of Israeli Raid
(0) Strategic 50% 0% 58%
(1) Retaliation 50 100 42
Result of Israeli Raid
(0) Retaliation, people die 33 58 66
(1) Reduce conflict 67 42 34
Cause of Palestinian Attack
(0) Retaliation, resistance 17 25 8
(1) Terror 83 75 92
Cause of Israeli-Egvotian Treatv
(0) Israeli Concessions 76 40 57
(1) Sadat, Egyptian desire 24 60 43
Result of Israeli-Egvotian Treatv
(0) Unclear, mixed results 0 47 100
(1) Good results 100 53 0
latent class probabilities .23 .62 .15
likelihood ratio chi-square 14.87 df-<14
percentage of cases correctly allocated 83. 13%
The first point to be noted about this model is that 
the bus attack does not differentiate between the three 
classes. The latent class analysis did not unmix those 
Israelis who view the attack as a form of terrorism (81%) 
from those who did not explain the attack in terms of 
terrorism (19%), indicating that there is a shared 
interpretation about the attack on the bus: it is a 
terrorist action. Israeli consensus about this is very high
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across all of the classes.
Class one could be termed the 'efficacy' outlook, in 
that the pattern of answers reveals a sensibility where 
Israel is seen as an active agent able to affect and change 
its environment. The first variable, cause of the Israeli 
raid on Beirut, indicates that people in class one are as 
likely as not to offer a retaliation explanation for the 
raid. However, whatever they say about the cause of the 
raid (whether in terms of retaliation or strategic 
considerations), they view the raid as resulting in reduced 
conflict or fewer attacks. The bus attack is seen as due to 
terrorism. The treaty is seen as arising from Israeli 
concessions and exchanges, and is seen overwhelmingly as 
having positive results. In other words, when Israel acts, 
either to defend itself or to procure a treaty, it is 
effective in moving in its desired direction. The efficacy 
pattern comprises 23% of the sample.
Class two, the largest class of the three identified 
among Israelis (62%), 'loads' most strongly on cause of the 
Israeli raid. The raid is seen as a form of retaliation for 
prior attacks, but in contrast to the efficacy outlook, the 
raid is not expected to reduce conflict. The bus attack is 
seen as a terrorist action. The treaty is seen as arising 
due to Sadat's initiative and/or Egyptian impetus, and the 
expectations about results of the treaty are not clearly 
differentiated for this class. These responses are
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stimulus-related: 'When they are bad, we will hurt them, and 
when they're good, we'll see'. The philosophy Implicit in 
this outlook is that 'Israel exists within a volatile 
environment; when the environment is hostile, respond in 
kind, when the environment is conciliatory, respond in kind. 
This class could be termed the 'reactive' pattern.
Class three, accounting for the smallest percentage of 
the responses (15%), could be called the 'hostile 
environment' pattern. These people view the Israeli raid in 
political-strategic terms of security, as a pre-emptive 
strike, where Beirut is seen as a PLO stronghold. However, 
they do not see the raid as being effective in reducing 
conflict; on the contrary, they see more war, Palestinian 
retaliation, people killed, etc. The Palestinian attack on 
the bus is nearly unanimously viewed as a terrorist action. 
The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is seen in terms of Israeli 
concessions and exchanges, but the treaty is expected to 
have unclear, possibly negative results. The sense here is 
that no matter what Israel does, whether to attack, to 
protect itself, to negotiate and give up things for the sake 
of a treaty, nothing good (peaceful) will come of it. The 
hostile environment is seen as unchanging. People with this 
outlook could be expected to be more pessimistic about the 
possibility of peace in the Middle East than the people with 
efficacy or reactive outlooks.
Israelis in the three classes identified using latent
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class analysis were expected to be differentiated on several 
points. The efficacy outlook contains an image of Israel 
that is self-sufficient, whereas the hostile environment 
class contains an image of Israel under siege.
Consequently, people in the efficacy class were expected to 
place less weight on the importance of foreign influence in 
determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict compared 
to people in the hostile environment class. In addition, it 
was expected that people in the efficacy class would prefer 
to retain or annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of 
Israel and would tend to reject 'compromise' solutions 
regarding the territories. The hostile environment class 
was expected to be the most pessimistic and despairing about 
future Israel-Arab relations.
A discriminant analysis was carried out to explore 
further the differences among the three classes. The 
results are shown in Table 16.
Table 16
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes: Israeli 
SAJBBl* (n-286)
Wilks"
Variable Lambda F sian
pessimism re: peaceful Is-Eg relations .966 4.93 .008
extent of Israeli identity .969 4.50 .01
acceptability of Palestinian state .978 3.18 .04
importance of foreign influence .983 2.67 .07
optimism re: Israeli-Palestinian rlns .983 2.49 .09
willingness for contact w/ Palestinians1.983 2.48 .09
sex .989 1.58 .21
willingness for contact w/ Egyptians .990 1.48 .23
ashkenazi/sephardi background .990 1.46 .23
religiosity .992 1.18 .31
importance of justice/faith .992 1.10 .34
acceptability of annexation of W.B. .992 1.05 .35
view of Palestinian-Egyptian relations .993 1.01 .36
school .994 .90 .41
optimism re: future I-E relations .994 .75 .47
age .997 .48 .62
ethnic-Jewish identification .998 .27 .76
importance of strength .998 .26 .77
after discriminant function:
canonical Wilks'• chi-sq sig.
correlation lambda <3ffunction #1: .37 .79 63.82 36 .003
function #2: .28 .92 22.9 17 .15
Only three of the predictor variables differentiate 
between the three latent classes to a significant degree at 
the univariate level. The first, which measures the extent 
of pessimistic expectations about the future of Israeli- 
Egyptian relations, differs significantly across the three 
latent classes: The efficacy class is the least pessimistic
(x - 1.9, s.d. « .98); the modal class slightly more (x * 
2.3, s.d. - 1.05) and the hostile-environment class is the 
most pessimistic of the three (x - 2.6, s.d. - 1.15).
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The second predictor variable which differentiates 
between the groups measures the extent of Israeli identity. 
(Respondents in the Israeli sample were asked to indicate 
how much they identified with various groups: Israelis, 
Israeli Jews, Jews, Ashkenazim, Sephardim.) People in the 
reactive class identify more consistently with this term (x 
~ .77, s.d. - .42) than do people in the other two classes 
(efficacy x “ .60, s.d. - .49; hostile environment x “ .60, 
s.d. - .50).
The third predictor variable with any univariate 
discriminatory power involves the acceptability of a 
Palestinian accommodation of some sort on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. The efficacy class is the least open to this 
notion (x - .68, s.d. * 1.0), the hostile environment class 
is slightly more open to this notion (x - .88, s.d. « 1*2), 
and the reactive class is the most open to this (x - 1.11, 
s.d. - 1.2). This predictor variable is one of several used 
to summarize a set of questions about the future of Israeli- 
Palestinian relations on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of 
the nine options regarding the future of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations and the status of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, none were clearly acceptable to the Israeli 
population in general (On a 5-point scale where 1 - 
unacceptable and 5 * acceptable, no proposal had a mean 
reaching 3.0 in this sample.). None of the remaining 
predictor variables separated the three classes
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significantly at the univariate level, including the 
demographic variables.
The discriminant function analysis results in two 
functions, shown in Table 16. The first has a canonical 
correlation of .37, where the division into the three 
classes accounts for 14% of the variance among the predictor 
variables taken as a set. The second function, with a 
canonical correlation of .28, has a lambda of .92 (chi- 
square « 22.9 with df - 17) indicates that the amount of 
discriminating information of the remaining variables is not 
statistically significant for differentiating between the 
groups. In other words, the three classes could be ordered 
linearly in terms of a single discriminant function, and 
using an additional dimension in the form of a second 
function does not add to the separation of the three groups.
III. The Egyptian sample
178 out of 530 cases are included in the latent class 
analysis of the Egyptian data. These represent the 
'complete' cases in which coded responses are available for 
each of the three political events.
Four variables are included in the analysis: cause of 
the Israeli raid, cause of the Palestinian attack, and cause 
and result of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. The four 
dichotomous variables yield a total of 24 « 16 possible 
response patterns. The modal answers for the entire sample
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are shown In the column headed "Overall" in Table 17; the 
modal answers for the subset of 178 cases included in this 
analysis are shown in the column headed "Analysis #1".
Table 17






















































"For Analysis #2 this category includes responses originally 
coded as "other" (56/530-10.6%).
The chi-square of independence for this sample is very 
low (likelihood ratio - 10.541, Pearson - 10.40, with 11 
degrees of freedom), indicating that there is no association 
or relationship among the four variables. Thus only one 
class is necessary to account for this pattern, and no 
further latent class analysis would be fruitful. (A two- 
class model was tested, but it did not represent a 
statistical improvement over the model of independence.)
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Given the pattern of "missing" answers described in 
Stage One of this study (see Table 2), in which there is a 
tendency for Egyptians to respond to questions about the 
Israeli-Egyptian treaty, but have missing responses to 
questions about the Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack, 
it is possible that a significant body of opinion was left 
out of the analysis above. A parallel problem exists in 
terms of answers coded as "other" for this sample (see Table
1). For this reason a second latent class analysis is done 
to include a broader range of cases from the Egyptian 
sample.
The second set of latent class analyses uses 497 out 
530 Egyptian cases. These include people whose responses to 
the Israeli raid and/or Palestinian attack were coded as 
"other" or "missing" (The percentages for each event are 
reported in Table 1 and Table 2.). Four variables are used 
in the analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause 
of the Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of 
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. A total of 96 response 
patterns are possible, based on two 4-level variables (raid 
cause and bus cause), one 3-level variable (treaty cause) 
and one dichotomous variable (treaty result). Table 17 
shows the distribution of responses in the column headed 
"Analysis #2".
This time the chi-square test for independence is high 
(likelihood ration chi-square - 331.52, Pearson chi-square =
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364.69, with 82 degrees of freedom), indicating that there 
is a relationship among the variables.
A two-class model was tested first, but it did not fit. 
Next, a three-class model (unrestricted) was tested, which 
resulted in an excellent fit between the model and the 
observed data (likelihood ration chi-square - 70.42 with 67 
degrees of freedom). A four-class model was also tested, 
and although it fit, it did not represent a statistically 
significant improvement over the 3-class model. The results 
of the three-class model are shown in Table 18.
Table 18






















likelihood ratio chi-square 70.42 df-67












The latent class analysis results in three basic 
response patterns for Egyptians: the modal response group; 
the people who do not answer raid or bus cause (i.e. 
"missing"); and the people who answer "other" on cause of 
raid and cause of treaty. These patterns corroborate what 
seemed apparent from the initial examination of the Egyptian 
data —  that there were three types of answers —  coded 
substantively, coded as "other" and coded as "missing". The 
latent class analysis thus far reveals that these response 
propensities hold across the variables taken as a set and 
constitute distinct types of response.
Despite the existence of these distinct groups, the 
latent class analysis points to a strong Egyptian consensus 
about the of results of the treaty, which holds irrespective 
of a person's latent class membership: about three quarters 
of the sample is enthused about the chance of positive 
results from an Israeli-Egyptian treaty, and one quarter of 
the sample is more skeptical.
For class one the substantive meaning of the pattern of 
response is clear. For both the Israeli raid and 
Palestinian attack the probabilities are nearly evenly 
divided between viewing 'retaliation' and 'aggression' as 
bringing about the Israeli raid, and between viewing 
'resistance' and 'retaliation' as bringing about the 
Palestinian bus attack. The view of the Israeli-Egyptian
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treaty is more clearly defined: people see it as due to 
Egyptian desire for peace and/or Sadat, rather than due to 
pragmatic considerations, and most people expect positive 
results from the treaty. This class comprises 51% of the 
sample, and can be termed the 'modal response'.
Latent class two is made up of those people who do not 
provide an answer for either cause of the raid of cause of 
the bus attack, but who do respond to the questions about 
the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. This class will be called the 
'treaty only' class. People with responses falling into this 
class rather than other classes are more likely than others 
to attribute the cause of the treaty to things other than 
Egypt/Sadat, although Egypt/Sadat remains the majority 
response. The treaty only pattern includes 22% of the 
sample.
Latent class three is made up of people who view the 
Israeli raid either in terms of Israeli aggression or as 
"other", the Palestinian bus attack either as retaliation or 
as "other", and the cause of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty 
either as "other" or as due to pragmatic considerations and 
concern about regaining the Sinai. Given that the "other" 
answers have a meaning that is not retrievable for the 
purposes of the present analysis, the question is whether 
the meaning of the responses in class three can be 
approximated on the basis of the patterns across the 
variables. If the substantive responses which fall into
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this class can be taken as Indicative of the outlook of this 
group, this class might be seen as more skeptical about 
peace than the majority of the Egyptian sample. This 
pessimism seems to emerge even in the case of results of the 
treaty, where this class appears to be more negative than 
class one respondents about the consequences of the treaty. 
This pattern can be termed the skeptical outlook, and it 
includes 26% of the sample.
Background factors were expected to differentiate among 
the three response patterns in the Egyptian sample. The 
treaty only group was expected to include younger women with 
less education living in rural areas -- this group of people 
was expected to be more politically naive or aware of 
regional politics in the Middle East than other Egyptians. 
People in the "other" class were expected to be better 
educated, older, possibly part of the Egyptian opposition in 
that they appear to be more skeptical about the peace treaty 
than people in the other two classes.
A discriminant analysis using both background and 
attitudinal variables was carried out next, to differentiate 
between the people in the three latent classes. The results 
are shown in Table 19.
Table 19




Lambda F signsex .925 18..47 .00
age .944 13..68 .00
optimism re: peaceful Is-Eg-Pal relations .973 6..47 .002
importance of strength .979 4..98 .007
urban/rural residence .983 3..94 .02
importance of leadership/Arab unity .989 2..52 .08
religion .990 2..38 .09
importance of russian influence, Jewry .990 2..26 .11
acceptability of Arab-Jewish state .990 2..22 .11
importance of justice, passage of time .993 1,.41 .25
acceptability of Palestinian state .994 1,.38 .25
school .994 1 , .35 .26view of past Is-Eg-Pal relations .995 1 ,.04 .35
acceptability of Jewish state .998 i.57 .57
religiosity .999 <.53 .59
willingness for task-related Is. contact .999 <.38 .69
expectations re: future Is-Eg relations .999 .29 .75
willingness for intimate contact w/ Is. .999 .26 .77





function #1: .37 .80 100.30 38 .00
function #2: .27 .93 34.01 18 .01
Of the demographic variables included in the analysis 
sex, age, urban/rural differences and religious affiliation 
each differentiate significantly between the three latent 
classes. Class one is 65% male, older (x* 33.1, s.d.*
11.7), 59% urban and 77% Moslem. Class two is 58% female, 
younger (x*26.0, s.d.* 10.3), more rural than the sample 
overall (46% compared to 39%) and more often Coptic than 
people in the other two classes. Class three is 65% female,
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older than people in class two ( x-31.4, s.d.* 11.2), 
mostly urban (73%) and Moslem (74%).
Of the attitudinal variables Included in the analysis, 
two differentiate between the three classes at the 
univariate level. The group means on optimism about future 
Israeli - Arab relations suggest that people in the treaty 
only class tend to be more hopeful than people in the other 
two class (and they may be more naive, too.). The variable 
measuring the role of strength (economic, military and 
demographic) in determining the outcome of the Middle East 
conflict is seen as more important by people in modal class 
or in the skeptical class than by people in treaty only 
class.
In multivariate terms two discriminant functions were 
formed, both of which are useful in differentiating between 
the three groups. The first, with a canonical correlation 
of .37, accounting for 14% of the variance, is highly 
correlated with age (+), optimism (-) and religious 
affiliation (moslem). The second function, with a canonical 
correlation of .27, accounting for 7% of the variance, 
correlates highly with sex (female), urban/rural differences 
(rural), role of leadership (important), and role of 
strength (important).
The discriminant analysis indicates that background 
variables (socio-cultural differences between groups of 
respondents) are significantly related to type of responses
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given to the political events by Egyptians, suggesting 
variations in the political culture of Egyptian society 
(along the lines of traditional, non-politicized versus more 
educated, male, politicized). The pattern of 
differentiation of attitudinal variables suggests that the 
main difference is between people in treaty only class and 
other Egyptians —  between the ignorant and the 
knowledgeable.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study involves an examination of the responses, 
explanations and interpretations offered by Israelis, 
Palestinians and Egyptians to three political events related 
to the Middle East conflict. The discussion of the key 
issues and findings of this study is divided into several 
sections. In the first part the major findings of this 
study are reviewed, findings regarding differences in 
outlook among the national groups, as well as variations 
within each national group about the meaning of the 
political events. In addition, the stimulus set used in 
this study is evaluated. The second part focuses on the 
utility of studying perceptions of political events as a 
means of getting at: l) within-group variations in outlook 
or 'worldview' or 'reality worlds;' and 2) the conflict 
interaction system via common ways of looking at different 
events at the between-group level. Finally, the 
implications of the study for conflict resolution theory and 
practice are explored.
A. Major Findings
The responses to the events often seemed truncated, or 
at least so well understood that there was no need for the 
respondent to spell out the meaning of the response to the 
interviewer. Thus it became clear that the overall task in
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the data analysis was to reconstruct the meaning or to 
excavate the underlying framework by which people in a 
society make sense of the changing stream of events and 
actions in the political environment. The first step in the 
'excavation' involved examining the differences in the views 
of the three national groups.
The study shows that each national group has a 
distinctive way of interpreting the 'same' event, to the 
point that the single stimulus event must be thought of as 
eliciting responses which reflect the particular concerns of 
each national group. However, within each national group 
there are various types of thinking about the three events 
taken as a set —  and probably about conflict and peace in 
general.
a. Palestinian sample (living in Israel). The study 
revealed two basic outlooks within this population: 1) The
conflict maintenance outlook: Israeli hostile action is
understood as an attempt to destroy Palestinians; the 
Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus is seen as an action in 
the name of Palestinian resistance; the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaty is seen as a form of betrayal for which Sadat 
is to blame, and the treaty is expected to bring increased 
conflict and tensions. Thus, change in the ongoing conflict 
environment is seen as unlikely, and the 'peace treaty' is 
understood as resulting in increased tensions. At the heart 
of this way of thinking lies an image of Palestinian
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Identity under siege, and as especially threatened by 
Israel. In this light the interpretation of the treaty as a 
hostile event can be understood: since the Egyptian/Sadat
treaty was not a help to the Palestinian cause, it is seen 
as a hindrance.
2) The reactive outlook: The Israeli raid on Beirut is 
understood in terms of Israeli retaliation for prior 
attacks, the Palestinian bus attack is seen as a retaliation 
or response to Israeli policies or attacks; Egypt and/or 
Sadat are credited for the treaty, which is expected to 
bring positive results. This group of people sees change in 
the conflict environment as a possibility — war actions are 
expected to result in more war, and a peace initiative is 
expected to bring peaceful results —  although the locus of 
change is the Other rather than the Self. Israel is seen in 
more conciliatory terms, and there is some optimism among 
people with this outlook that peace between Israel and Egypt 
does not negate Palestinian aspirations. This group of 
people has a stronger 'Israeli-Arab' identity compared to 
the conflict maintenance group, although both groups 
identify strongly (first and foremost) as "Palestinians" and 
as "Arabs". Finally, further evidence of a more 
conciliatory stance towards Israel among this group of 
people is seen in their readiness to accept Palestinian 
autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an acceptable 
solution to the problem of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
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Background factors did not differentiate to a 
statistically significant degree between these two groups of 
people, although schooling and age were somewhat correlated 
with latent class membership: younger, better educated
people tend to have a conflict maintenance outlook, whereas 
older, less well educated, more traditional people tend to 
have a reactive outlook. This pattern resembles studies of 
American Blacks and extent of radicalism (cf. Marx, 1967) . 
Similarly, Tajfel (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) 
has remarked upon the changing social identity of dominated 
groups. The findings of the present study lend support 
Smooha's (1984) typology of political identity of Arabs 
living in Israel (based on data collected in 1976). He 
identified three basic orientations among Arabs in Israel: 
accommodating, reserved and dissident. The conflict 
maintenance group resembles the Smooha's dissidents, and the 
reactive group seems to combine the accommodating and the 
reserved orientations.
b. Israeli (Jewish) sample. Three basic patterns of 
thinking emerged regarding the political events. The 
efficacy outlook contains an image of Israel as successful 
in influencing the environment in the direction desired to 
achieve Israel's aims. Thus the Israeli raid on Beirut is 
seen as effective in reducing conflict. Similarly the 
treaty is brought about through Israeli concessions and
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exchanges In order to achieve good results —  namely, peace. 
This Is an Image of Israel in control of the environment and 
of the conflict, rather than an image of Israel at the mercy 
of the Other. This is apparently a super-hawkish outlook, 
in that among the three outlooks, people with the efficacy 
pattern place the greatest emphasis on the importance of 
tangible strength, and are the most in favor of options 
regarding the West Bank which involve annexing the 
territories and even expelling the Arab populations. They 
are the least open to 'compromise' solutions regarding the 
West Bank. They identify less strongly as 'Israeli' 
compared to people in the reactive pattern (but they 
identify to a degree comparable to the hostile environment 
group).
In contrast, the reactive pattern is based on a notion 
that 'what comes around, goes around,' wherein each event is 
interpreted in terms of what provoked it. The Israeli raid 
is seen as a response to prior attacks, and is expected to 
result in more attacks and retaliation by the other side.
By the same token the treaty is perceived as a positive 
overture by Sadat and as evidence of Egypt's desire for 
peace, and it is expected to have positive results. People 
with this pattern are more open to changes in the political 
environment than the other two groups, but they see change 
as originating in other actors, rather than being initiated 
by Israel.
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The third class, the hostile environment outlook, is 
particularly concerned with Israel's survival in the face of 
a hostile world. These people see the raid on Beirut as 
strategically motivated as an attempt to rout out 
terrorists, but consider it ultimately ineffective in 
reducing conflict. Rather, in the long run the conflict is 
expected to persist and to remain unresolved. The bus 
attack is seen almost unanimously in terms of Palestinian 
terrorism and hatred of Jews, more so than by the other two 
classes. The treaty is seen as coming about due to Israeli 
concessions, but its results are seen as unclear or 
negative. Thus, Israel is felt to be at the mercy of a 
hostile political environment, which Israel can do nothing 
to change. More than the other two groups, this group of 
people places more emphasis on the importance of outside 
(foreign) influence in determining the outcome of the Middle 
East conflict, a feeling which goes along with the analysis 
that without outside help, Israel can do little on its own 
to survive.
Demographic factors did not differentiate among persons 
with the three outlooks identified among Israeli 
respondents. This finding is to be contrasted with the 
general point made by a group of political scientists about 
Israeli society, namely, that there appears to be an 
overwhelming consensus in Israeli society about national 
security, irrespective of 'social location' (cf. Arian,
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Herman and Talmud, in press). The present study suggests 
that although Israelis may agree that terrorism against 
Israelis is a horrible thing, there is variation at the 
cognitive level regarding issues such as how Israel ought to 
handle terrorist actions or what 'peace' means. These 
cognitive differences did not have demographic correlates in 
this study, but the differences exist, despite consensus on 
certain specific points.
c. The Egyptian sample is essentially unified in 
outlook about the events, despite the existence of different 
styles of response that are demographically correlated. No 
clear consensus emerges about the meaning of either the 
Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus attack, whereas Egyptian 
views about the treaty and Egypt's leadership role in it are 
very clear. The treaty itself has taken on nearly symbolic 
meaning for Egyptians. The people who offer coded responses 
to the events tend to view the treaty in terms of idealistic 
peace —  Sadat and the Egyptian people initiated peace 
because they desired it, because they felt that negotiations 
were important. People whose responses to the hostile 
events had been coded as "other" had a more skeptical view 
of what peace brings than other Egyptians. People who "had 
not heard" of the two hostile events tended to view the 
treaty idealistically, although more of them viewed the 
treaty in pragmatic terms than did people in the modal 
group.
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Egyptians view the others, Israelis and Palestinians, 
as the cause of the conflict. Either they ignore the others 
and their hostile actions (i.e. which resulted in missing 
responses to the questions about the Israeli raid on Beirut 
and the Palestinian attack on the bus in Israel) and attend 
only to the one event that involves their society in a 
central way, or they blame both Palestinians and Israelis 
(in fact they blame Israel a little more) and they see Egypt 
as stepping into the fray to make peace.
d. Methodologically. latent class analysis used in 
this study proved to be an advance in terms of how to handle 
problematic data. The Egyptian sample in particular 
appeared problematic at the outset of this study because not 
only was around one quarter of the sample's responses coded 
as "missing" for two out of the three stimulus events, but 
in addition nearly one quarter of the sample had responses 
that had been coded as "other" for these events. Analysis 
of the remaining cases resulted in a set of responses which 
did not differentiate the population (and it was only 
178/530 cases), so that it appeared that the sampling in 
Egypt had not been done well and had not succeeded in 
reaching a range of people within Egyptian society.
The use of latent class analysis to analyze for 
patterns of response using the full set of cases made it 
possible to retrieve the meaning of these types of response 
to the political events. It showed the systematic nature of
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the missing data. From these patterns it became clear that 
in fact the sampling had been done quite well in terms of 
reaching various segments of the population, but that the 
response tendencies for some of these segments tended to 
differ. Young, often Coptic women with less schooling who 
live in rural areas responded to the hostile events with "I 
haven't heard about this" or "I don't know", whereas well 
educated, urban, Moslem women responded to these events in 
terms that were not captured by the clearly inadequate 
coding scheme used to code the data. (In contrast an 
adequate scheme would have been sufficient to capture these 
responses.) Zeisel (1947/1985) has discussed the handling 
of different types of 'missing' data (See also Davies and 
Jacobs (1968)).
In contrast, demographic factors were not especially 
helpful in differentiating between the various patterns of 
thinking in the Palestinian and Israeli cases. Latent class 
analysis identified various patterns of thought in the 
Israeli and Palestinian samples which cut across demographic 
factors. However in the Egyptian case the demographic 
factors were essential and highly correlated with response 
type. To explain the difference in the role of background 
variables in the three samples one can refer to several 
types of similarities between the Israeli and Palestinian 
samples which distinguish them from the Egyptian case. At 
the level of sampling there could have been a difference.
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But all three samples are quota samples, based on the 
attribute space described In the methods section of this 
study.
More likely is a difference in the nature of the 
societies and their respective political cultures. It 
should be noted that the Palestinians in Israel and Israeli 
Jews were drawn from among people living within Israel, so 
that at least in purely geographic terms these people share 
the same space, and probably they are informed by many of 
the same or similar media communications. (This is an 
argument about similar contexts for the Israeli Jews and 
this group of Palestinians). A still more effective 
argument is that Israeli and Palestinian societies (wherever 
they are sampled in the world) are more politically engaged 
and concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict, because it 
involves them more centrally than it affects the Egyptians. 
Thus the patterns of thinking about political issues cut 
across demographic factors, more or less in both of these 
populations. This pattern of Israeli and Palestinian 
engagement and Egyptian distance seems to be true for other 
Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian samples from the Images 
study (sampled in the USA, for instance.)
As represented in this sample, Egyptian society appears 
to be of a different sort —  more stratified, with more 
layers of difference based on social location than is the 
case for either Israeli Jews or Palestinians living in
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Israel. There seems to be a traditional sector and a more 
developed sector, a difference which Is related to age, sex, 
education and urban/rural differences. Irrespective of 
sector, the treaty and Egypt's Initiating role have 
penetrated into all strata of Egyptian society.
2. War and peace actions
The structure of aggregate-level responses for the 
three events taken as a set suggests that there are 
distinctive ways of perceiving or explaining war (Israel1- 
Palestinian) actions which differ from perceptions or 
explanations regarding treaty-related (Israeli-Egyptian) 
actions. This was indicated in two ways: first, the types
of interpretation offered for hostile actions differed from 
the interpretations about the peace treaty. Second, the 
pattern of similarities and differences in outlook among the 
three national groups was constant for the two hostile 
events but changed in relation to the peace treaty.
The type of explanation offered for the cause of a 
hostile action has to do with the relationship between the 
interpreter's nationality and the national actor's 'role' in 
the stimulus action. The aggressor justifies the action, 
whereas the victim blames the aggressor. The hostile 
actions elicit conflict-related interpretations from each 
party: We are victims; they are aggressors. The two hostile 
actions, the Israeli raid on Beirut and the Palestinian
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attack on a bus in Israel, result in mirror images, and thus 
can be considered as functionally equivalent actions, in 
that they generate comparable types of explanation. 
Egyptian/Palestinian ('Arab') versus Israeli differences 
predominated for the hostile Israeli-Palestinian actions. 
What Arabs blamed, Israelis justified and what Israelis 
blamed, Arabs justified. Egyptian-Palestinian differences 
in interpretation of the hostile interactions were minuscule 
compared to the Arab-Israeli differences.
The peace treaty resulted in different types of 
explanation as well as in an altered pattern of Arab-Israel 
differences (mirror images) and Egyptian-Palestinian 
similarities in interpretation. The sorts of explanations 
offered for cause and results of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty were different enough from the explanation about the 
hostile actions to warrant a separate coding scheme. The 
treaty elicited a set of concerns different from the ones 
elicited by war actions: what peace 'costs,' what is to be 
gained, what is not being addressed by a treaty. The 
structure of explanation was different, although because 
there was only one peace action it is difficult to determine 
what the explanations would have looked like if Israel had 
initiated a peace action. However, a subgroup of 
Palestinians viewed this event as a hostile action, for 
which they blamed Sadat. Consensus about the meaning of the 
treaty was high among Egyptians, the initiators of the 
action, but lower among Israelis and Palestinians.
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Consensus within each national group shifted in 
relation to the different stimuli. For Israelis and 
Palestinians, events where a group sees itself as victimized 
(Israeli raid for Palestinians and Palestinian attack for 
Israelis) resulted in more extreme responses (blame) and 
greater consensus than other events. For Egyptians this was 
true about the treaty, regarding which Egypt sees itself as 
the central actor, the initiator of positive change.
These areas of consensus can be taken as evidence of 
'negative' and 'positive national identity' (S. P. Cohen, 
personal communication, Autumn, 1982), where negative 
identity emphasizes aspects of the nation's history which 
are seen as part of an ongoing experience of victimization 
(exile, diaspora, suffering and destruction). In contrast, 
positive national identity is a national self-image which 
emerges out of the pursuit of the nation's ideals and goals 
for national development. In the present study the hostile 
actions elicited explanations involving negative national 
identity, whereas for Egyptians the peace treaty elicited 
aspects of positive national identity.
The calculus or logic of war is different from that of 
peace. In the hostile actions the Other is blamed for 
instigating an action or forcing the Self to defend itself 
or assert its existence. The environment is seen as 
changing for the worse, because of the Other. To deal with 
this hostile environment, each side must assert itself and 
its needs.
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One factor which differentiates war from a period of 
transition towards peace is that the goals and motivations 
in wartime are clearer than they are in changing from war to 
peace. In all-out war, the presumption is that 'they are 
out to get us'. In transition time, the motivations become 
more suspect: 'they may be trying to trick us.' Even if
'they are sincere,' 'they are only a minority and the 
majority will topple their decision'. Each optimistic, hope- 
based idea is subject to the 'reality principle' of 
skepticism and mistrust.
3. Evaluation of the stimulus set
a. It is unfortunate that the order of the three 
events in the stimulus set was not varied within each of the 
populations. The fact that the three events in this study 
were presented to respondents in only one order probably 
underscored the Egyptian and Palestinian tendency to see a 
sequence as 'first Israelis raid, then Palestinians 
retaliate'.
b. Various types of responses were elicited by the 
different stimulus events: hostile interactions resulted in 
'self-as-victim', whereas the treaty shifted the focus to 
'what is gained or lost' in the name of peace.
Unfortunately the range of stimuli was rather limited; only 
one peace-related action was used, and it involved Israel 
and Egypt only (whereas the hostile actions involved Israel 
and Palestinians only).
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The stimulus set did not include an Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperative action, or, an Egyptian-Israeli conflict action. 
Thus it is hard to tell whether the 'peace treaty' aspect of 
the third stimulus, as distinct from the Israeli-Egyptian 
nationality (alliance) aspect of the action (or from some 
interaction of these elements) distinguishes the third 
stimulus from the first two. These dimensions are 
confounded in the stimulus set as given.
This particular set of stimuli managed to tap only so 
much of the outlook of each group. This limitation might 
explain, for instance, the absence of the leftists/peace­
niks from the patterns uncovered in the Israeli sample.
They do not emerge particularly in the latent class 
analysis, because the areas of contention on which they 
would be expected to differ the most from their compatriots 
are not tapped by the three stimulus events. If additional 
stimuli had been used (such as "Israeli professors and 
students demonstrate on the West Bank in support of 
reopening the Palestinian Bir Zeit University, closed by 
Israeli authorities"), perhaps a wider range of sentiments 
would have been expressed.
As consideration of the stimuli used in this study 
indicates, it is difficult to apply an experimental, system- 
based framework to an historically grounded phenomenon. As 
Parsons (1965) has commented, this sort of study has an 
"irreducible historical element" that controlled
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experimental studies do not have. "In other words, the kind 
of asymmetry that I suggested has been operating in the 
organization of living systems generally involving the 
irreversibility factor, applies here at the methodological 
level" (p. 65). The point is that with historically-based 
data, as opposed to theoretically-derived data, there are 
necessarily empty cells in the stimulus set (i.e. this was 
not a fully crossed design). The three of the stimulus 
events used in this study were historically factual —  they 
had actually happened. It would be interesting to speculate 
about how the use of counter-factual events would be 
received by respondents. For instance, how would Arabs 
react if Israel made a peace overture? This question is 
relevant for the design of a study and more important in 
historical terms. A large number of missing answers would 
be expected, because many people would probably reject this 
concept out of hand. Such an inquiry would be a way of 
using socio-psychological data to 'try out* the reactions of 
the populations at large to new types of political actions. 
This would be an advance over the types of laboratory 
simulations that political scientists often have tried (c.f. 
Guetzkow (1959) for instance).
14 2
B. Utility of looking at interpretations of political 
events
The comparison of the explanations given by people in 
three societies about various political events seems 
interesting in the first place because it is one 'window* 
into the deeper set of beliefs which people/societies use to 
make sense of the world they inhabit. Certainly this is 
related to the core belief ideas of Leites and A. George, 
and 0. Holsti, as well as to operational code approach used 
to understand key decision-maker's choices and policy 
decisions. The difference in this study is partly one of 
scope: rather than examining the belief system of an 
important individual political actor or at the views of 
elites and influentials in the involved societies (cf. 
Heradstveit, 1979), this study analyzed the outlooks among 
the general populations of three societies involved in the 
conflict. Thus the content of people's understanding of the 
political world is in itself a worthy object of study, since 
there are no prior public opinion studies about Arab and 
Israeli attitudes .
The present research presents a snapshot of people's 
outlooks at a single moment in time. In a study like this 
one, which was undertaken in order to examine some processes 
involved in a transition from war to peace in the Middle 
East, the type of explanation became the object of interest, 
once the content of the explanation was understood. It was
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hoped that the types of explanations about the various 
political events offered by people In the three national 
groups would serve as an Index about the cognitive changes 
Involved In moving from war to peace. The change In 
attributions or cognitions were difficult to examine with 
the present data-set, which is cross-sectional, but not 
longitudinal.
A preferable means of studying a transition from war 
to peace is to use a longitudinal design: to tap the
responses of people in different societies to various 
changes in their world at various points in time. In this 
way the real world would be treated as a sort of giant 
laboratory and the political events occurring in it would be 
used as stimuli for a large-scale unplanned experiment. 
Cantril (1958) did use this rationale in 1956 for looking at 
how people viewed the Hungarian Uprising, which happen to 
occur while he was studying the "protest voters" in several 
European societies. This approach would be a more powerful 
'manipulation' than a laboratory experiment with people in 
different 'conditions' which would be used to approximate 
the real world (or to distill the essence of a real world 
situation in a laboratory situation), because the people 
come from the experience under scrutiny. However, the real- 
world approach is also more 'messy', as the problems pointed 
out regarding the present study show.
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Geertz (1973), in his essay "Thick Description", talks 
about the 'natural experiment' as one of the (unfortunate) 
ways that ethnographers attempt to link the particular 
research they do to the general world at large. He argues 
that the rationale of the natural experiment is problematic, 
because although there is certain to be variation in the 
world's cultural forms, "the context in which it occurs 
varies with it.." (p. 22-23). This criticism could be 
leveled at the type of research described here. However, 
regarding the cross-national study of attitudes and 
explanations about political events, the basic justification 
for comparing the responses of people in different societies 
is based on the fact that the comparison itself is not a 
hypothetical one originating in the mind of the researcher. 
Rather, it emerges directly from the existence of ongoing 
conflict between nations or societies, and lies at the heart 
of conflict resolution. It relates to the question of how 
adversaries, who start at such diametrically opposed and 
competing positions, can come to coexist in an environment, 
with a lower level of violence and hopefully ultimately in 
peace. The interaction system created by the conflict is 
the object of study.
Alker (1968) has noted regarding cross-national studies 
of modernization and development that there is a need to 
improve how longitudinal inferences are made from cross- 
sectional results. Several types of inferences are sought
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based on the data about political events. First, the study 
has shown that the response patterns are different in the 
three national groups (1. e. same stimulus produces 
different effects within each of the groups.). Second, the 
hostile events are comparable, in that they produce 
symmetric patterns of response among the three groups (i. e. 
similar stimuli result in comparable patterns of response 
among three different groups, suggesting that they are 
actors in the same interaction system.). Finally, the peace 
treaty differs from the hostile actions in that it changes 
the pattern of response among the actors in the system. It 
should be clear, also, that the cross-national data are used 
AS iX the three national groups were interrelating within an 
interaction field that is really impossible to capture.
Campbell (1958) wrote an article called "Common fate, 
similarity and other indices of the status of aggregates of 
persons as social entities," which deals with the issue of 
when it is reasonable to treat an aggregate as an entity in 
terms of objective and subjective validity. This conception 
seems relevant to the approach taken in this study, namely, 
that it makes sense to look at the parties to an 
international conflict as part of the same system, in 
relation to a common social structure.
Built into the set of inferences made in this study is 
the moving back and forth between levels of analysis within 
the conflict interaction system. The study began with an
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analysis of the meaning of three events within each national 
group. Then an analytic scheme was devised for coding 
events across the three national groups. Next, the changing 
pattern of 'relations' among the three national groups was 
examined in terms of the similarities and differences in 
response (in the frequency distributions) to the stimulus 
events. Finally the data were examined for the existence of 
within group variations, rather than allowing the analysis 
to 'rest' merely at the point of uncovering between-group 
differences, which were to be expected in the first place.
C. Once these different ways of understanding events in 
conflict and peace are identified, how useful is this for 
conflict resolution?
The attribution scenario of actor and observer 
explaining to the 'same' stimulus action has been treated 
like a microcosm for understanding the basic socio- 
psychological dynamics of international conflict. Whatever 
the shortcomings of using such an analogy, the essential 
point remains, that there are different ways of interpreting 
an action, depending on the interpreter's relationship to 
the action: actor, victim/recipient, interested other, 
bystander.
The language of perception has been used in discussing 
this study. Perception involves aspects of the field that 
the perceiver must perceive in addition to characteristics
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of the perceiver's own internal make-up —  underlying 
concerns, or a basic template for looking at certain types 
of events. Attribution theory makes this a social process, 
in the sense that social position in relation to the action 
becomes a variable, too.
The analysis of attributions between enemies reveals 
the parallel structure, the mirror images offered by people 
affiliated with the various parties in a conflict. The 
analysis is helpful because it lays out the differences in 
perception between the adversaries. However, the existence 
of symmetric, mirror accounts of the 'same types of actions' 
does not mean that there is also a rationality assumption 
thrown in, too (i.e. "in your shoes I'd do the same thing"). 
A. Rapoport's (I960) distinction between opponents in a game 
and adversaries in a fight is apropos. In a game, while 
there may be irreconcilable differences between the parties, 
the opponent is essential to the game, and one prefers a 
worthy opponent to a weak one. The behavior of both parties 
is determined by the same rules; the outcome is a function 
of interdependent moves. In a fight the adversary is 
someone to be removed from the field or destroyed. Thus, 
although to an outsider the symmetric aspects of the 
preferred modes of reasoning in conflict may be apparent 
(and quite elegant), each of the adversaries is faced with 
or engulfed by more essential concerns: survival, security,
recognition, rather than a neat exercise in symmetry.
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The original stance taken at the start of this study 
was to link people's interpretations of political events to 
the framework used by researchers in causal attribution —  
actor-observer differences in explanations of the 'same' 
action. At the end of this study it seems clear that a more 
appropriate context for considering the cross-national 
interpretations of political events is a widened, more 
macro-level socio-cultural perspective, rather than a purely 
cognitive social psychological perspective.
It is not sufficient for the purposes of conflict 
resolution to show that adversaries offer divergent accounts 
of the 'same' thing. Such an analysis does not deal with 
the meaning and substance of the attribution, which are 
essential to know in trying to solve a conflict.
In conflict resolution some attention has been given to 
explaining one's own side and one's view of the adversary. 
The present study Bhowed the built-in tendencies for seeing 
one's own side as victim in hostile interactions, but also 
for focusing on one's own party's interests and needs in 
relation to a peace action. Including the treaty as an
stimulus event is important as a first step in learning more
about the gray areas of attribution in times of transition 
from war to peace. A broader range of events may expand the
range of images of the nation which are possible.
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The Implication of the present study Is that more types 
of events are needed In the interaction system which can 
shake up the closed perceptual system created by ongoing 
hostile events. Social psychologists have tended to ask, 
'how can perceptions be changed?,' implying that the way to 
resolve conflicts is to deal with the perceptions that seem 
to perpetuate hostilities, and to try to change them by 
addressing perceptions directly via cognitive techniques: 
teaching people about their different perceptions, talking 
about them and so on.
The perspective taken in this study is that the way to 
change perceptions is to change the stimuli —  events —  
which are the material to be perceived, in order to provide 
opportunities for different types of perceptions. In this 
light the effectiveness of the problem solving conflict 
resolution workshop (Kelman, Cohen) can be explained: it
becomes an event by being a live instance of communication 
across groups which succeeds in being credible for the 
Israeli and Palestinian participants, more important than 
any sort of substantive outcome that might emerge from the 
workshop.
Attention needs to be given to designing peaceful 
actions which can be perceived as peaceful by the involved 
parties. From the present research it was clear that such 
actions need to be directed at all of the particular groups. 
For instance, even though the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was
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Intended as a peace action (intended by Egypt, perceived 
that way by Israelis; also, it was intended to be the one in 
the stimulus set that was about peace), the peace treaty was 
perceived by many Palestinians as a hostile action because 
it did not deal with Palestinians and it was not directed 
toward them.
To assess change in a social system a particular 
attribute, like social structure, needs to be examined 
before and after change has occurred. In this vein it is 
useful to conceptualize social structure as a cluster of 
traits., and 'traits' as abstractions from the contentions 
among groups of people within a system of society:
"..Social structures are defined by a set of issues 
which comprise the characteristic areas of contention 
among the constituent groups of a society. If we then 
say that one social structure has ceased to exist and 
another has taken its place, we mean that the terms of 
reference have changed by which the issues are defined, 
relationships maintained or contentions resolved." 
(Bendix, 1968, p. 72)
About the case at hand we can say that the issues 
defined by the parties are the same, so that in a conflict 
like the one in the Middle East, which has gone on for 
decades/generations (i.e. 'protracted') the parties have 
become part of the an 'emergent' social structure, based on 
their ongoing [hostile] interaction. Changing the conflict, 
resolving it, involves fundamental changes within and 
between the parties: the development of a new language as a
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cause and consequence of new deeds, new framework for making 




Precodes for Events Questions
RAIDl: "The Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut.
What would bring about this event?"
01 - Retaliation for Palestinian attack or
military activities
02 - Retaliation for PLO attack or military
activities
03 - Retaliation for terrorist attack or military
activities
04 “ Israeli aggression, against
Arabs/Palestinians (i.e. desire to attack, 
kill, etc.)
05 ■ War, hatred
06 - Pre-emptive strike, to prevent attack
07 - Political move
08 - No reason, nothing
09 - Beirut is a PLO stronghold/ (attempt to
weaken or destroy PLO)
10 - Israelis are terrorists
11 “ Palestinians are terrorists
12 " U.S. support of Israel
13 - Israeli expansionism
14 - Status quo, the situation
15 * Israel's justification for its security
16 - PLO - Israeli conflict over southern Lebanon
17 - Attempt to destroy or exterminate
Palestinians
18 ■ Israeli economic or internal problems
19 - Retaliation for Lebanon attack 
88 ■ Other
99 ■ No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
RAID2: "Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut. 
What would be its results?"
01 - People killed,death, destruction (general)
02 - Innocent people killed, hurt
03 - Retaliation (unspecified)
04 - Retaliation by Palestinians
05 ■ Retaliation by PLO
06 - More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
07 - Revenge by both sides
08 - Terrorists killed, hurt
09 “ Reduce conflict, reduce terrorist attacks
10 ■ World opinion —  negative towards Israel
(against Israel)
11 ■ World opinion —  positive towards Israel (in
favor of)
12 - Too much media attention (no right to so much
coverage)
14 - Nothing, no result
15 - U.N. response
16 “ Unity of Arab countries against Israel
17 - U.S.A. reaction
18 - More unrest and demonstrations (in the West
Bank and Gaza)
19 - Lebanon's response to the PLO
20 - Lebanon's response to Israel
21 - Israeli victory
22 - PLO strengthened
23 - PLO weakened or destroyed
24 - End of peace with Egypt
25 ■ Negative impact on peace/autonomy talks
26 ■ Annexation of Lebanese territory
27 ■ Palestinian will or determination is
strengthened
28 ■ Positive effect on peace talks (i.e. no more
PLO influence)
88 - Other
99 - No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
BUSl: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv 
Highway. What would bring about this event?"
01 - Retaliation for Israeli attacks
02 - Response to Israeli policies
03 - Palestinian resistance, struggle against
Israel
04 - Terrorist activities
05 - Desire for world attention —  no right to
attention
06 - Desire for world attention for their cause
07 - War, hatred
08 ■ Hatred of Jews, desire to hurt Israelis
09 - No reason, nothing
10 - Personality characteristics of Palestinians;
that's the way they are
11 - Attempt or desire to interrupt "normal" life
in Israel
12 - World attention
13 - Attempt or desire to make demands heard;
(e.g. release of prisoners)
14 - Policy of PLO
15 - Attempt or desire to regain Palestinian
homeland
16 - Attempt or desire to terrorize civilians,
murder women and children
17 - Afraid or unable to attack the army 
88 - Other
99 « No answer/refused to answer/' don' t know1
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Precodes for Events Questions
BUSl: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv 
Highway. What would be its results?"
01 «■ People killed,death, destruction (general)
02 - Innocent people killed, hurt
03 - Terrorists killed, hurt
04 - Retaliation by Israelis
05 - Retaliation by Israelis (large-scale
military assault)
06 - Retaliation by Israelis in the West Bank
07 - More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
08 - World opinion (negative) against Palestinians
09 - World opinion (positive) in favor of
Palestinians
10 “ Achieve the objective of stating their cause
11 - Reduce conflict
12 - Force Israel to recognize Palestinian rightsto land
13 - Media attention (negative coverage)
14 - Media attention (positive coverage)
15 - World attention
16 - Increase Israel's military
17 « Security tightened in Israel (administrative
and political)
18 - Nothing
19 - Expel Jews from Palestinian land/get rid of
Jews
20 - Affects peace talks negatively 
88 - Other
99 - No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
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Precodes for Events Questions
TREATY1: "A peace treaty is announced between Israel 
and Egypt. What would bring about this event?"
01 - Desire for a better economy
02 - Negotiations, discussions, peace talks
03 - Egypt's desire for peace, acknowledged it
can't win the war, tired of fighting
04 - Extra-regional involvement, U.S., U.N.,
U.S.S.R. pressure, influence or intervention
05 - Sadat
06 “ Sadat's treason
07 ■ Sadat the visionary
08 - Begin
09 - USA
10 - No reason, nothing will bring it about, can't
happen
11 ■ Arab recognition of Israel
12 - Recognition of Palestinian homeland
13 - Recognition of Palestinian autonomy and
rights
14 “ Desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs, divide
Arab countries
15 “ Israel's desire for peace, acknowledged it
can't win the war, tired of fighting
16 - U.S., Sadat, Begin
17 « Egypt's desire to regain land (Sinai)
20 - Mutual (Egypt and Israel) desire, compromise,
concessions
21 « Economic and social pressure within Egypt
22 “ Leadership change
24 - Sadat's/Egypt's desire for U.S.
support/al1iance
25 - October (1973) War
26 ■ Sadat's (personal) self-interest
27 - Sadat's/Egypt's/general deception
28 - Israeli concessions (one-sided, heavy)
88 - Other
99 * No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
158
Precodes for Events Questions
TREATY1: "A peace treaty Is announced between Israel 
and Egypt. What would be its results?"
01 ■ Better economy
02 " Increased chance for peace In the Middle
East; more peaceful world; it would stop the 
killing
03 - Loss of Arab support for Egypt, Egyptian
isolation
04 - No results, nothing would happen, no
difference
05 ■ Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
07 - Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai
08 - Loss of Sinai and the security it provided
09 - Increase in the conflict
10 - Reexamination of Arab countries' stand
towards Israel
11 - Continuation of occupation and conflict
12 “ Lessening of tensions
13 “ Sadat's assassination
14 ■ Normalization of relations
15 " Bad for Israel
16 - Bad for Palestinians
17 - Bad for Egypt or Egyptians
18 - Bilateral peace Egypt/Israel only: end war
Egypt/Israel only
19 - Short-term peace (general)
20 - Increased power for Israel; increased attacks
on other Arab states; Israel free to do as 
she pleases
21 - U.S. interests served 
88 - Other




Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut 
70.8% retaliation for terrorist attack (3)
9.4 Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)
5.8 retaliation for PLO attack (2)
3.6 retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)
2.6 pre-emptive strike (6)
1.9 Israeli security (15)
1.7 political motive (7)
1.1 Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
0.9 PIA-lsrael conflict over south Lebanon (16)
0.6 war, hatred (5)
0.4 Israeli expansionism (13)
0.4 destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)
0.2 Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.2 Palestinians are terrorists (11)
0.2 No reason, nothing (8)
0.2 status quo, the situation (14)
100.0 t (N-469)
[Codes not used: U.S. support for Israel (12); Israeli 
economic or internal problems (18); retaliation for Lebanon 
attack (19).]
Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut 
29.9% reduce conflict (9)
14.6 PLO weakened (23)
14.6 (negative world opinion [12.4] (10)
(UN response [1.5] (15)
(too much media [0.7] (12)
12.6 more conflict (6)
8.6 terrorists killed (8)
9.1 (people killed [7.3%] (1)
(innocent people killed [1.8%] (2)
4.4 (retaliation [2.2%] (3)
(retaliation by Palestinians [.7%] (4) 
(retaliation by PLO [1.5%] (5)
2.7 nothing (14)
0.7 revenge by both (7)
0.7 positive world opinion (11)
0.4 Israeli victory (21)
0.4 Palestinian will strengthened (27)
0.2 Arab unity against Israel (16)
0.2 US reaction (17)
0.2 unrest on West Bank (18)
0.2 Lebanon's reaction to PLO (19)
0.2 Lebanon's reaction to Israel (20)
0.2 PLO strengthened (22)
99.9 % (N-452)
[Codes not used: end peace treaty (24) ; negative impact on 




Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut 
25.5% Israeli aggression vs. Arabs (4)
23.6 destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)
17.3 retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)
8.7 Israeli expansionism (13)
4.3 retaliation for PLO attack (2)
4.3 Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)
4.3 Israelis are terrorists (10)
2.9 war, hatred (5)
2.4 political motive (7)
1.4 pre-emptive strike (6)
1.0 retaliation for terrorist attack (3)
1.0 retaliation for Lebanon attack (19)
1.0 Israeli security (15)
1.0 Israeli economic or internal problems (18)
0.5 US support for Israel (12)
0.5 status quo (14)
0.5_____PLO-Israel conflict over south Lebanon (16)
100.2 % (N-208)
[Codes not used: Palestinians are terrorists (11), and 
nothing, no reason (8).]
Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut 
44.9% more conflict, war (6)
29.4 (people killed [22.7] (1)
(innocent people killed [4.8] (2)
(terrorists killed [1.9] (8)
8.6 (retaliation by Palestinians [4.3] (4) 
(retaliation by PLO [2.4] (5)
(retaliation [1.9] (3)
3.9 negative world opinion (10)
1.9 UN response (15)
1.4 positive world opinion (11)
1.4 Palestinians strengthened (27)
1.4 Arab unity against Israel (16)
1.0 PLO weakened (23)
1.0 nothing (14)
0.5 reduce conflict (9)
0.5 revenge by both (7)
0.5 US reaction (17)
0.5 Lebanon's response to PLO (19)
0.5 Lebanon's response to Israel (20)
0.5 Israeli victory (21)
0.5 PLO strengthened (22)
0.5 end of peace treaty (24)
0.5 negative impact on peace (25)
0.5 annex Lebanese territory (26)
0.5 positive impact on peace (28)
99.9 % (N-207)
[Codes not used: too much media (12); more unrest and 
demonstrations (West Bank/Gaza) (18); PLO strengthened (22)]
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Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut 
28.8% Israeli expansionism (13)
17.9 Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
14.6 Beirut is a PLO stronghold (9)
13.4 (retaliation for Palestinian attack [8%] (1)
(retaliation PLO attack [2.9] (2) 
(retaliation terrorist attack [1.8] (3) 
(retaliation for Lebanon attack [.7] (19)
9.1 Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians (17)
4.0 war, hatred (5)
4.0 political motive (7)
2.2 PLO-Israeli conflict in south Lebanon (16)
1.8 pre-emptive strike (6)
1.5 Israel justification for security (15)
1.1 Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.7 no reason (8)
0.4 status quo (14)
0.4 Palestinians are terrorists (11)
99.9 % (N-274)
[Codes not used: Israeli economic or internal problems (18); 
US support for Israel (12)]
Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut
43.3 more war (6)
30.4 (people killed [28.5] (1)
(innocent people killed [1.9] (2)
6.9 (retaliation [3.1] (3)
(retaliation by Palestinians [1.9] (4) 
(retaliation by PLO [1.9] (5)
3.8 negative impact on peace (25)
3.1 annex Lebanese territory (26)
1.9 positive impact on peace (28)
1.9 nothing (14)
1.6 negative world opinion (10)
1.3 PLO weakened (23)
1.3 Lebanese response to Israel (20)
0.9 revenge by both (7)
0.6 unrest/demonstrations in West Bank (18)
0.6 Lebanese response to PLO (19)
0.6 PLO strengthened (22)
0.3 terrorists killed (8)
0.3 reduce conflict (9)
0.3 UN response (15)
0.3 Arab unity against Israel (16)
0.3 Israeli victory (21)
0.3 Palestinian will strengthened (27)
100.0 % (N-319)
[Codes not used: end peace treaty (21); US reaction (17); 
too much media (12); positive world opinion (11)]
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Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian attack on Bus
37.3 terrorist activity (4)
22.4 hatred of Jews (8)
8.6 terrorize civilians (16)
4.5 war, hatred (7)
4.5 interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
4.1 Palestinian resistance (3)
4.1 Policy of PLO (14)
3.7 (desire for world attention [2.6] (6) 
(desire world attention - no right [.9] (5) 
(world attention [.2] (12)
3.2 retaliation for Israeli attacks (1)
2.6 Palestinian personality (10)
1.3 no reason (9)
1.1 response to Israeli policies (2)
1.1 make demands heard (13)
1.1 regain Palestinian homeland (14)
0.4 afraid to attack the army (17)
100.0 % (N-464)
Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus
22.9 retaliation by Israel (large-scale) (5)
21.0 retaliation by Israel (4)
16.3 more war, conflict, hostility (7)
13.2 innocent people killed (2)
13.0 people killed (1)
5.6 Israeli security tightened (17)
2.3 negative world opinion (8)
1.4 nothing, no results (18)
1.0 achieve goals (10)
0.8 world attention (15)
0.6 terrorists killed (3)
0.4 reduce conflict (11)
0.4 affect peace negatively (20)
0.2 retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)
0.2 positive world opinion (9)
0.2 force Israel to recognize Palest, rights 12)
0.2 negative media attention (13)
increase Israel's military (16)
99.9% (N-485)
[Codes not used: 'expel Jews from their land' (19); 'pro-
Palestinian media attention' (14).]
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Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus
45.0 retaliation for Israeli attacks (l)
12.8 Palestinian resistance (3)
9.5 response to Israeli policies (2)
6.2 make demands heard (13)
5.7 desire for world attention (6)
4.7 war, hatred (7)
4.3 interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
3.8 regain Palestinian homeland (15)
2.4 hatred of Jews (8)
2.4 terrorist activity (4)
1.4 desire for world attention - no right (5)
0.5 terrorize civilians (16)
0.5 policy of PLO (14)
0.5 Palestinian personality (10)
0.5 world attention (12)
100.2 % (N-211)
[Codes not used: 'no reason' (9); 'afraid to attack army' 
(17).]
Results of Palestinian Attack on Bus
37.9 more war (7)
10.4 people killed (1)
10.4 retaliation by Israel (4)
10.0 retaliation by Israel - largescale (5)7.1 force Israel to recognize Pal. rights (12)4.7 innocent people killed (2)
4.3 achieve goals (10)
3.3 reduce conflict (11)
1.9 negative world opinion (8)
1.9 positive world opinion (9) 
increase Israel's military (16)1.4
1.4 affect peace negatively (20)
0.9 terrorists killed (3)
0.9 retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)0.9 world attention (15)
0.9 nothing, no result (8)
0.5 negative media attention (13)
0.5 positive media attention (14)
0,5 expel Jews from Palestinian land(19)99.8 % (N-211)
[Code not used: 'Israeli security tightened' (17).]
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Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus
36.0 retaliation for Israeli attack (1)
28.2 Palestinian resistance (3)
9.6 response to Israeli policy (2)
8.7 war, hatred (7)
5.4 hatred of Jews (8)
3.9 (desire for world attention [2.1] (6)
(world attention [1.5] (12)
(desire world attention - no right [.3] (5)
3.0 attempt to regain Palestinian homeland (15)
1.8 terrorist activity (4)
1.5 interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
0.6 Palestinian personality (10)
0.6 make demands heard
0.3 policy of PLO (14)
0.3 afraid to attack the Israeli army (17)
99.9 % (N-333)
[Codes not used: 'no reason* (9); 'terrorize civilians'(16).]
Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus
35.8 more war (7)
24.3 (people killed [20.2] (1)
(innocent people killed [2.5] (2) 
(terrorists killed [1.6] (3)
22.4 (retaliation (general) [15.6] (4) 
(retaliation, large-scale [4.0] (5) 
(retaliation on West Bank [2.8] (6)
6.2 affect peace talks negatively (20)
2.8 negative world opinion (8)
2.5 achieve their goals (10)
1.2 reduce conflict (11)
1.2 nothing, no result (8)
0.9 world attention (15)
0.6 force Israel recognize Pal. rights (12)
0.6 positive world attention (9)
0.6 Israel tightens its security (17)
0.3 expel Jews from Palestinian land (19)
0.3 positive media attention (14)
99.7 % (N-321)
[Codes not used: 'negative media attention' (13)]
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Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Israel1-Egyptian Peace Treaty26.2 compromise, concessions (20)
24.7 Sadat (5)
14.7 Egyptian desire for peace (3)
8.0 Sadat the visionary (7)
4.0 Begin (8)
3.8 October 1973 War (25)
3.4 Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
3.0 Israeli desire for peace (15)
2.0 leadership change (22)
1.6 negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)
1.6 economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
1.4 desire for a better economy (1)
1.2 extra-regional involvement, pressure (4)
0.8 Sadat's treason (6)
0.8 Arab recognition of Israel (11)
0.8 US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.6 Sadat's deception (27)
0.6 Israeli concessions (28)
0.4 USA (9)
0.2 no reason, can't happen (10)
99.8 % (N-497)
[Codes not used: 'recognition of Palestinian homeland' (12) 
'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'Sadat's self-interest'(26).]
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
20.6 increased chance for peace (2)
17.4 bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
15.7 normalization of relations (14)
14.0 lessening tensions (12)
6.6 Sinai transferred (7)
6.6 short term peace (19)
5.1 Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
3.6 Better economy (1)
3.4 loss of Sinai security (9)
1.5 loss of Arab support for Egypt (3)
1.3 Bad for Israel (15)
1.1 no results, no change (4)
1.1 increased conflict (9)
0.6 re-examine Arab attitudes re:Israel (10)
0.4 increased Israeli power (20)
0.4 US interests served (21)
0.2 continued occupation and conflict (11)
0.2 bad for Palestinians (16)
0.2 bad for Egypt (17)
100.0 % (N-471)
[Codes not used: Sadat's assasination (13).]
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Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
21.0 Egyptian desire for peace (3)
17.3 Sadat (5)
14.5 Sadat's treason (6)
7.5 Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
7.5 economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
5.1 desire for a better economy (1)
4.7 US pressure, outside involvement (4)
4.7 USA (9)
4.2 negotiations, discussions, peacetalks (2)
2.3 Sadat the visionary (7)
1.9 Israeli desire for peace (15)
1.4 October 1973 War (25)
1.4 Sadat's self-interest (26)
0.9 recognition of Palestinian homeland (12)
0.9 no reason, can't happen (10)
0.9 US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.5 leadership change (22)
0.5 desire to isolate Egypt (14)
100.0 % (N-214)
[Codes not used: 'Begin' (8); 'Arab recognition of Israel'
(11); 'Sadat/Egyptian desire for US support or alliance' 
(24); 'Sadat's deception' (27); 'Israeli concessions' (28).]
Results of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
27.6 increased chance of peace (2)
14.9 loss of Arab support for Eg. (3)
10.5 Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
9.9 bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
7.7 increased conflict (9)
6.1 normalization of relations (14)
5.5 better economy (1)
4.4 short-term peace (19)
2.8 increased power for Israel (20)
2.2 bad for Palestinians (16)
1.7 Sinai transferred (7)
1.7 continued occupation and conflict (11)
1.7 US interests served (21)
1.1 no results, no change (4)
1.1 reexamine Arabs' stand re:Israel (10)
0.6 Sadat's assasination (13)
0.6 bad for Egypt (17)
100.1 t (N-181)
[Codes not used: 'loss of Sinai security' (8); 'lessening
tensions' (12); 'bad for Israel' (15).]
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Egyptian 1st Wave:
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty49.1 Egyptian desire for peace (3)15.5 Egyptian desire to regain land (17)11.5 Sadat (5)
6.6 desire for better economy (1)3.9 negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)2.7 October 1973 War (25)2.5 mutual compromise, concessions (20)1.2 Sadat's treason (6)1.2 USA (9)
1.0 Sadat the visionary (7)1.0 extra-regional involvement - USA/UN/USSR (4)0.7 US - Sadat - Begin (16)0.7 Sadat's self-interest (26)0.7 Israeli desire for peace (15)0.5 Recognition of Palestinian rights (12)0.2 Sadat's desire for US alliance (24)0.2 Arab recognition of Israel (11)0.2 Recognition of Palestinian autonomy (13)
Qt2 Israeli concessions (28)99.6 % (N-407)
[Codes not used: 'Sadat's self-deception' (27); 'leadership 
change' (22) ; 'economic and social pressure within Egypt' 
(21); 'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'no reason, can't 
happen' (10); Begin (8).]
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty46.5 increased chance for peace (2)17.1 Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)15.1 better economy (l)
8.1 bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)3.4 normalization of relations (14)3.1 Egyptian isolation/loss Arab support (3)1.6 lessening tensions (12)1.6 Sinai transferred (7)
1.1 short-run peace (19)0.7 no results (4)0.7 increased conflict (9)0.4 increased Israeli power (20)0.2 Sadat's assassination (13)0.2 Bad for Egypt (17)
9,2 Bad for Israel (15)100.0 % (N-445)
[Codes not used: 'US interests served' (21); 'Bad for 
Palestinians' (16); 'continued occupation and conflict'
(11); 're-examination of Arab attitudes towards Israel'
(12); 'loss of Sinai security' (8).]
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1) ... for Palestinian attacks
2) ... for PLO attacks
3) ... for terrorist attacks 














6) pre-emptive strike 1.8
7) political motive 4.0 
9) Beirut is a PLO stronghold 14.6 
12) US support of Israel
IB) Israeli security justification 1.5 













4) Israeli aggression vs. Arabs
10) Israelis are terrorists
11) Palestinians are terrorists 
13) Israeli expansionism


















8) no reason, nothing
14) status quo



















Palestinians attack: "What would bring about this event?"
EGYPTIANS PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
Retaliation
n = 3 3 3 n =211 n=464
1) retaliation for Israeli attacks







Political-Strategic (Palestinian resi 
3) Palestinian resistance 
6) desire for world attention
12) world attention
13) to make demands heard




















Blame (terror, hatred of Jews)
35.4 29.0 9.1
4) terrorist activity
5) desire world attention - no right 
8) hatred of Jews
10) personality characteristic of Pal
11) interrupt 'normal' life in Israel 
14) policy of PLO
16) terrorize civilians, murder




































Israeli raid: "What would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
Retaliation n= 219 n =207 n=452
3) retaliation 3.1% 1.9% 2.2%
4) retaliation by Palestinians 1.9 4.3 .7
5) retaliation by PLO 1.9 2.4 1.5
7) revenge by both sides .9 .5 .7
10) world opinion negative against Isr . 1.6 3.9 12.4
12) too much media (no right) — -- .7
15) UN response .3 1.9 1.5
16) unity of Arab countries vs Israel .3 1.4 .2
17) USA reaction .5 .2
18) more unrest in West Bank and Gaza . 6 — .2
20) Lebanon's response to Israel 1.3 . S .2
22) PLO strengthened .6 -- .2
27) Palestinian will is strengthened .3 1.4 .4
12.8% 18.7% 21.1%
Achieve Goals (reduce conflict)
9) reduce conflict, terrorist attacks .3 .5 29.9
11) world opinion positive toward Israel — 1.4 .7
19) Lebanon's response to PLO .6 .5 .2
21) Israeli victory .3 .5 .4
23) PLO weakened or destroyed 1.3 1.0 14.6
26) annexation of Lebanese territory 3.1 .5 —
28) positive effect on peace talks 1.9 .5 —
7.5 4.9 45.8
People Killed
1) people killed, death, destruction 28.5 22.7 7.3
2) innocent people killed, hurt 1.9 4.8 1.8
8) terrorists killed, hurt .3 1.9 8.6
30.7 29.4 17.7
More War
6) more war, conflict 43.3 44.9 12.6
14) nothing, no result 1.9 1.0 2.7
24) end peace with Egypt — .5 —
25) negative impact on peace 3.8 .5 1.3
49.0 46.9 15.3
TOTAL 100.0% 99.9% 99.9%
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Palestinian attack: "What would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
n = 321 n = 211 n = 485
Retaliation
4) retaliation by Israelis 15.6% 10.4% 21.0%
5) Israeli larqe-scale military assault 4.0 10.0 22.9
6) retaliation by Israel in West Bank 2.8 .9 .2
8) world opinion negative vs. Palest. 2.8 1.9 2.3
13) media coverage (negative) — .5 .2
16) increase Israel's military — 1.4 .2
17) Israeli security tightened .6 — 5.6
25.8% 25.1% 52.4
Achieve Goals
9) world opinion favors Palestinians .6 1.9 .2
10) achieve objectives of stating cause 2.5 4.3 1.0
11) reduce conflict 1.2 3.3 .4
12) force Israel to recognize Pal rights .6 7.1 .2
14) media attention (positive coverage) .3 .5
15) world attention .9 .9 . 8
19) expel Jews from Palestinian land .3 .5 —
6.4 18.5 2.6
People Killed
1) people killed, death, destruction 20.2 10.4 13.0
2) innocent people killed, hurt 2.5 4.7 13.2
3) terrorists killed, hurt 1.6 .9 .6
24.3 16.0 26.8
More War
7) more war, conflict 35.8 37.9 16.3
18) nothing, no result 1.2 .9 1.4
20) affect peace talks negatively 6.2 1.4 .4
43.2 40.2 18.1
TOTAL 99.7% 99.8% 99.9
I
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Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty : "what would bring about this event?"
EGYPTIANS PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
n = 407 n =214 n = 497
Israeli Needs or Contribution
8) Begin — -- 4.0%
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel .2% — .8
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war .7 1.9% 3.0
20) mutual desire, compromise 2.5 4.2 26.2
22) leadership — .5 2.0
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided) .2 — .6 •
3.6% 6.6% 36.6%
Palestinian Needs or Contribution 
4) extra-regional involvement 1.0 4.7 1.2
6) Sadat's treason 1.2 14.5 .8
9) USA 1.2 4.7 .4
10) no reason, can't happen — .9 .2
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland .5 .9 —
13) recognition of Palestinian rights .2 — —
14) desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs — .5 --
26) Sadat's self-interest .7 1.4 —
27) Sadat's deception — — . 6 •
4.8 27.6 3.2
Egyptian Contribution
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war 49.1 21.0 14.7
5) Sadat 11.5 17.3 24.7
7) Sadat, the visionary 1.0 2.3 8.0 •
61.6 40.6 47.4
Pragmatic Concerns
1) desire for better economy 6.6 5.1 1.4
2) negotiations 3.9 2.8 1.6
16) USA, Sadat, Begin .7 .9 .8
17) Egyptian desire to regain land 15.5 7.5 3.4
21) economic and social pressure in Eg. 7.5 1.6
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support




TOTAL 99.6% 100.0% 99.8%
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Things to be Gained
1) desire for better economy 6,
17) Egyptian desire to regain land 15.
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support .2
Negotiation Framework
2) negotiations 3.9
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war 49.1
5) Sadat 11.5
7) Sadat, the visionary 1.0
8) Begin
9) USA 1.2
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war .7
16) USA, Sadat, Begin .7
22) leadership —
Exchange or Concessions for Peace
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel .2
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland .5
13) recognition of Palestinian rights .2
20) mutual desire, compromise 2.5
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided) .2
extra-regional involvement 1.0
economic and social pressure in Eg. 
October (1973) War 2.7
Sadat's treason 1.2
no reason, can't happen 











m g  about this event?"
PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS


































2) increased chance of peace
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel
12) lessening of tensions
14) normalization of relations
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only
19) short-term peace
Sinai
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided
Increased Tension
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt
4) no results, nothing
9) increase in the conflict
11) continuation of occupation, conflict
13) Sadat's assassination
15) bad for Israel
16) bad for Palestinians
17) bad for Egypt 
21) US interests served


































. 4 2.8 .4 «
5.5 33.3 6.4




Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would be its results?"
EGYPTIANS PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
n = 445 n = 181 n = 4 71-
Good Results
1) better economy 15.1% 5.5% 3.6%
2) increased chance of peace 46.5 27.6 20.6
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel — 1.1 .6
12) lessening of tensions 1.6 — 14.0
14) normalization of relations 3.4 6.1 15.7
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai 17.1 10.5 * * *
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai 1.6 1.7 * * *
85.3% 52.5% 54.5
Unclear or Mixed Results
4) no results, nothing .7 1.1 1.1
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai * * * * * * 5.1
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai * * * * * * 6.6
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only 8.1 9.9 17.4
19) short-term peace 1.1 4.4 6.6
21) US interests served — 1.7 .4
9.9 17.1 37.2
Bad Results
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt 3.1 14.9 1.5
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided — — 3.4
9) increase in the conflict .7 7.7 1.1
11) continuation of occupation, conflict -- 1.7 .2
13) Sadat's assassination .2 .6 --
15) bad for Israel .2 -- 1.3
16) bad for Palestinians — 2.2 .2
17) bad for Egypt .2 .6 .2
20) increased power for Israel .4 2.8 .4
4.8 30.5 8.3
TOTAL 100.0% 100.1% 100.0
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